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ABSTRACT
Motivated by the attacks on control systems through the cyber (digital) part,
we study how signal attacks injected through actuators and/or sensors affect
control system stability and performance. We ask the questions: What are
the different types and scenarios of signal attacks? When are the attacks
stealthy and unbounded? How to compute the worst stealthy bounded at-
tacks? How to defend against such attacks through controller design? How
to identify and estimate signal attacks before significant performance loss
happens? We answer the above questions in this thesis using tools from con-
trol theory. We show that it is necessary to use a sampled-data framework
to accurately assess the vulnerabilities of control systems. In addition, we
show that the most lethal attacks are related to the structure of the system
(location of zeros and poles, number of inputs and outputs). We show that
dual rate control is a powerful tool to defend against these vulnerabilities,
and we provide a related controller design. Furthermore, we show that the
worst stealthy bounded attacks can be computed by an iterative linear pro-
gram, and we show how to lessen their effects through iterative controller
design. Finally, we study the trade-off between control and estimation of
signal attacks and provide several controller designs utilizing the power of
dual rate sampling.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Figure 1.1: Cyber-physical systems.
Advancements in communication, sensing and computing technologies have
led the control of physical systems or plants to be implemented over networks
(cyberspace), leading to the creation of “cyber-physical” systems. Such sys-
tems are found in many applications including the smart grid and vehicle
control units as depicted in Figure 1.1. However, the interaction between the
cyber part and the physical part introduced security challenges that can be
exploited by malicious agents. It has been shown through real world incidents
and published research simulations that stealthy attacks can be carefully de-
signed to cause significant damage in the control system [1, 2, 3]. The most
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famous is the Stuxnet attack in which a designed computer malware infected
the Siemens programmable logic controllers (PLCs) of a nuclear enrichment
plant in Iran. The malware spread through standard USB devices and it was
estimated that it infected 100,000 computer systems. The attack started by
recording centrifuge measurements for a period a time, and then intercept-
ing the real measurements and replaying the recorded data indicating regular
operating conditions, while at the same time injecting harmful actuation sig-
nals. It was estimated that around 1000 centrifuges were damaged by the
attack.
Most work on securing cyber-physical systems focuses only on software
security. While it is true that software security is the first line of defense,
it is also clear that this line can be infiltrated as happened in the Stuxnet
attack. Once attackers gain access to the cyber (digital) space (Figure 1.2),
they can exploit their knowledge of the structural properties of the control
system (e.g., pole-zero locations) to induce stealthy unbounded and bounded
attacks that destroy the systems or at least affect their performance (even
non-invasive intrusion is possible [4]). Moreover, even if the attack is not
stealthy, it may be too late to react. Since these types of undetectable attacks
are mainly related to system structure, it is very important to research the
vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems from a control-theoretic perspective,
and find solutions that guarantee the security, stability and resiliency of
control systems under different attack scenarios.
One might argue that control theory has already developed fault detec-
tion frameworks [5] that can handle various faults and disturbances, and
that these frameworks are sufficient for handling attacks on control systems.
However this argument fails to recognize that there are substantial differ-
ences between cyber-physical attacks and faults. These differences suggest
that a fault-tolerant system may not be secure against carefully designed
sophisticated attacks, and they stem from the fact that faults are considered
random events that do not have malicious intents. In addition, the occur-
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Figure 1.2: Cyber-physical systems with attacks on the cyber part.
rence of more than one fault at the same time is considered to have a low
probability. On the other hand, malicious attacks can attack more than one
point in the control system in a coordinated fashion. Moreover, they are care-
fully designed (intelligent) to exploit weaknesses in the system and may not
be detectable (stealthy). Therefore, existing fault detection frameworks are
not sufficient to design secure cyber-physical systems, and a new more thor-
ough framework that takes into account the characteristics and signatures of
attacks is needed to handle the various threats.
1.2 Related Work
Recent work on security of cyber-physical systems from a control-theoretic
perspective has been focused on the characterization of feasible and optimal
(for some cost function) attacks and proposing ways for detection and/or im-
proving the resiliency of the control system subject to such attacks. The type
of attacks studied can be generally split into two categories: static attacks
(attacks that do not take into account the dynamics of the system and/or
do not affect the states of the system directly) or dynamic attacks. Attacks
under each category can be classified as stealthy or not stealthy depending on
the assumptions and the detection methods used. Examples of static attacks
3
include attacks on the power system state estimators [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12],
where a carefully designed bias can be added to the sensor measurements
without being detected by the commonly used statistical detection methods.
Another work on static attacks is by [13] and [14] where they showed that the
states of the system cannot be accurately reconstructed if half of the sensors
are attacked. Both papers propose computationally intensive methods to re-
construct the states when less than half of the sensors are attacked such that
the system is observable from the remaining un-attacked sensors (solving an
`0 optimization problem in [13] and constructing a bank of observers in [14]).
In [15] the authors showed that to accurately estimate the states, it is suffi-
cient for the system to be detectable from the un-attacked sensors (provided
less than half are attacked). The bank of observers in [14] was substituted by
a bank of Kalman filters in [16] to estimate the states under attack given that
the measurements are corrupted by noise, by leveraging the noise statistics
over a large enough time window, and by [17] using event-triggered observers.
The work in [13] was also extended by [18] where the authors provide a frame-
work to reconstruct the states that is robust to additive and multiplicative
errors. On the other hand, research work related to dynamic attacks includes
the study of replay attacks by [19, 20] in which the authors inject a designed
random signal (watermarking signal unknown to the attacker) into the sys-
tem to detect the attack at the expense of increasing the cost of the LQG
controller. The authors provide and solve an optimization problem to de-
sign the watermarking signal to maximize the detection ability and minimize
false alarms. In a similar context, [21] presented an information theoretic
formulation of the problem, and showed that if the watermark is a Gaussian
distributed random variable, then the maximal performance degradation for
any given level of stealthiness for the attacker is achieved when the attacker
replaces the control input with the realization of a Gaussian random variable.
They also showed that the watermark signal that minimizes the stealthiness
of a Gaussian attacker is also Gaussian. In [22] static and dynamic attack
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models on linear time-invariant systems are provided along with conditions
for stealthiness. In addition they provide filter design methods to detect a
class of (detectable) attacks under centralized and distributed fashion. In [23]
the case for finding the worst constant bias (steady state) attack has been
considered and a tractable procedure to compute it has been developed where
the energy of the detection signal was considered as a measure of stealthiness.
A similar framework was studied in [24] for the design of optimal attacks on
automatic generation control (AGC) systems. In [25] coordinated actuator
and sensor attacks are computed that create unbounded expectation of the
estimation error while keeping the residual of the KF detector bounded. In
[26] optimal attacks are computed on an LQG system that minimize the
K-L divergence between the true and falsified state estimates such that the
attack impact is above a specified a limit, showing that the optimal attacks
are additive white noise. In [27] sufficient conditions of the existence of an
optimal attack sequence that drives the states to a desired set are provided
using dynamic programming, where the system is equipped with a Kalman
filter for state estimation. In [28] optimal actuator attacks are designed using
the minimum principle that maximizes a quadratic cost related to the error
between the healthy (un-attacked) system and the attacked system while
minimizing the attack cost, without including any stealthiness requirement.
In [29], the authors investigate attacks on power systems that act by switch-
ing between loads in a coordinated manner inducing a sliding mode which
drives the frequency to instability. These switching attacks are investigated
again in [30] exciting the inter-area oscillation modes in a coordinated man-
ner to drive groups of system generators out of step. This way only a small
amount of the load is needed to be controlled by the attacker to induce in-
stability. In [31] the authors presented a stochastic approach for optimal
planning under malicious attack on sensors. The approach uses Markov de-
cision processes theory (MDP) to obtain an optimal policy to drive a vehicle
that has inconsistent measurements.. Resiliency against attacks is achieved
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by properly selecting the reward function of the MDP, thus avoiding actions
that could hijack the vehicle to undesired regions of a state space. In [32] the
authors studied denial of service (DoS) attacks and obtained sufficient condi-
tions on the DoS duration, and frequency bounds for stabilization with finite
data rates, which are characterized by the decay rates of the quantization
range in the presence and absence of DoS attacks. In the same context of
DOS attacks, [33] studies structural resilience of LTI systems under attacks.
Specifically they provide conditions for the controllability of the systems un-
der Dos and integrity attacks. In [34], the authors study controllability and
stability properties of dynamical systems when actuator or sensor signals are
under attack. The authors study the impact of these attacks and propose
reactive countermeasures based on game theory. In [35] the authors study an
attackers ability to control a maritime surface vessel by spoofing GPS signals.
The authors formulate an optimization problem to find the attacker’s control
law, and provide a detection mechanism. In [36], the authors use tools from
LMI theory to solve an optimization problem that finds the optimal artificial
actuator saturation limits that maximize the reachable sets of the states,
while guaranteeing that the dangerous states are not reachable.
1.3 Overview
This thesis addresses the problem of security of cyber-physical systems from
a control theory perspective. In particular, the thesis contributes towards a
comprehensive framework to analyze, identify, and evaluate the consequences
of existing vulnerabilities in cyber-physical systems. This framework will help
us propose defense and protection schemes.
The proposed framework is based on sampled-data (SD) systems since
it captures the behavior of cyber-physical systems in the sense that the
controllers are implemented digitally and the physical plants evolve in a
continuous-time domain. Moreover, the SD approach allows us to assess
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the security of cyber-physical systems as it can help us visualize how addi-
tive attacks can be injected in various parts of the cyber-physical system and
analyze their effects on stability and performance. In addition, SD approach
is necessary because SD implementation generates additional vulnerability
to stealthy attacks by introducing additional, so-called sampling zeros in the
system as the sampling rate increases (e.g., [37]). Thus, while a system may
be secure to stealthy attacks using a continuous-time analysis, it may not be
secure using a more accurate, continuous- and discrete-time, SD framework.
In this thesis, we employ the SD framework to characterize the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of stealthy unbounded actuator
and/or sensor attacks. We define the attack detection or monitoring mecha-
nism and then we show that stealthy unbounded attacks are related to the
unstable zeros or poles of the system. We also show that unbounded co-
ordinated sensor and actuator attacks are always feasible regardless of the
structure of the system. The analysis is done in an input-output fashion,
which provides a framework for future analysis and study of different types
of attacks on cyber-physical systems as it can provide mappings between an
attack and its effect on various points of the feedback loop. We then pro-
vide a defense scheme based on dual sampling to detect stealthy unbounded
actuator attacks, and we investigate trade-offs in the controller design.
After considering stealthy unbounded attacks, we shift our focus to stealthy
bounded attacks. While bounded attacks may not induce catastrophic events,
their effect on cyber-physical systems can still be severe. This is because since
bounded attacks cannot cause instability in linear time-invariant (LTI) sta-
ble systems, they can be injected repeatedly into the system without being
detected, degrading the performance and efficiency of the system and in-
ducing stress on the physical part. An example would be injecting a signal
that would increase the voltage across a machine’s terminal or increasing
the speed of uranium centrifuges. Moreover, after a loss in performance is
observed, the system operator will have a hard time deciding whether the
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loss of performance is due to a random failure or a carefully designed attack
since the attack is stealthy, bounded and with bounded effects. In addition,
bounded attacks are more practical to inject since usually actuators have
saturation limits. In this part, we consider the problem of characterizing
the worst bounded and stealthy attacks under different attack resource and
stealthiness constraints. We employ discrete input-output maps describing
the effect of the attack signal on the performance variable and the monitor-
ing variables. The objective is to find a traceable computation procedure to
find the worst stealthy attack signal. We define the “worst” attack as the
attack that induces the maximum damage on the performance variable in a
`∞ sense. Using this computation, we will be able to assess the vulnerabil-
ity and resiliency of the system with respect to the considered attack. We
consider different attack resource constraints and stealthiness intervals, and
provide an iterative controller synthesis procedure that alternates between
computing worst attacks and designing optimal controllers that enhance per-
formance and minimize the impact of worst attacks.
Next we consider the problem of estimating signal attacks on the actuators
and/or sensors of control systems using the available measurements. The
estimated attack signal will help the operator decide whether it is a persistent
intelligent attack or just a nominal disturbance. We show that the design
of the controller for estimation and controller for rejection are coupled, and
that a trade-off exists between their individual performances. The quality of
the estimate depends on the performance of the attack rejection controller.
Then we provide controller design methods to estimate the signal attack.
To guarantee that all unbounded attacks are detectable, we use a faster
sampling loop for the estimation controller so that unstable zeros in the map
from the attack signal to the measurements are removed. Furthermore, dual
rate estimation allows for the construction of unknown input observers.
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1.4 Outline and Contribution
In the following we present the outline of this thesis.
Chapter 2: Preliminary Results
In this chapter we present some of the standard results in the literature that
are used to build the main results of this thesis.
Chapter 3: Conditions for Existence of Unbounded Actuator and/or Sen-
sor Attacks
In this chapter we introduce the SD framework that we will be using to in-
vestigate the security of cyber-physical systems. We introduce attacks on
actuators and sensors, represented as additive and unbounded disturbances
on the digital (i.e., cyber) part of the controlled system. We examine from an
input-output perspective the exact conditions under which such attacks can
be stealthy, which brings up the role of unstable zeros, poles and structure
of the open loop, continuous-time, physical plant, regardless of the specific
controller and/or detection (e.g., Kalman) filter in use.
Chapter 4: Dual Rate Control for Detecting Unbounded Actuator Attacks
In this chapter we introduce multirate sampled-data (MRSD) control as a
solution to detect unbounded actuator attacks on cyber-physical systems.
We show that, if there is a single sensor that is guaranteed to be secure and
the plant is observable from that sensor, then there exists a class of multi-
rate sampled data controllers that ensure that all attacks remain detectable.
These dual rate controllers are sampling the output faster than the zero or-
der hold rate that operates on the control input, and as such, they can even
provide better nominal performance than single rate, at the price of higher
sampling of the continuous output.
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Chapter 5: On the Computation of Worst Attacks: An LP Framework
In this chapter we consider the problem of characterizing the worst bounded
and stealthy attacks. This problem involves a maximization of a convex
function subject to convex constraints, and hence, in principle, it is not easy
to solve. However, by employing an `∞ framework, we show how tractable
linear programming (LP) methods can be used to obtain the worst attack
design for different attack scenarios. Moreover, we provide a controller syn-
thesis iterative method to minimize the worst impact of such attacks and
test its efficacy in a power system component.
Chapter 6: On the Estimation of Signal Attacks
In this chapter we consider the problem of estimating signal attacks injected
into the actuators or sensors of control systems, assuming the attack is de-
tectable (can be seen at the output). We show that there exists a trade-off
between attack rejection and control, and that the estimator design depends
on the controller used. We use dual rate sampling to enhance detectability of
the attacks and we provide different methods to design the estimator. The
first method is by solving a model matching problem subject to causality
constraints. The second method exploits dual rate sampling to accurately
reconstruct the unknown input. The third method is using a dual rate un-
known input observer. We provide conditions on the existence of these esti-
mators, and show that dual rate unknown input observers always exist if the
multirate system does not have a zero at 1.
Chapter 7: Summary
In this chapter we summarize the work done in this thesis..
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CHAPTER 2
STANDARD RESULTS
In this chapter we present some of the standard results in the literature
([37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44]) that are used to build the main results of this
thesis.
Some standard notation we use is as follows: Z+, Rn, Cn and Rn×m denote
the sets of non-negative integers, n-dimensional real vectors, n-dimensional
complex vectors and n × m dimensional real matrices, respectively. For
any Rn or Cn vector x we denote x′ its transpose and |x| := maxi
√
x2i
where x′ = [x1, x2, ..., xn]; for a sequence of real n-dimensional vectors, x =
{x(k)}k∈Z+ we denote ||x||∞ := supk |x(k)|; for a sequence of real n × m
dimensional real matrices G = {Gk}k∈Z+ we denote its z-transform G(z) :=∑∞
k=0Gkz
−k; and if viewed as the pulse response of the LTI system G then
||G||1 = sup||x||∞≤1 ||Gx||∞.
2.1 Discrete-Time Systems
2.1.1 Basic Concepts
The discrete-time set is taken to be the integers {0, 1, 2, . . . }. A discrete-time
signal is a sequence {v(0), v(1), v(2), . . . }, where each v(k) is a real number.
The λ-transform of a v is defined to be
vˆ(λ) := v(0) + v(1)λ+ v(2)λ2 + · · · =
∞∑
k=0
v(k)λk.
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Any causal LTI system G has a matrix of the form
[
G
]
=

g(0) 0 0 . . .
g(1) g(0) 0 . . .
g(2) g(1) g(0) . . .
...
...
...
 .
A system G is causal if and only if
[
G
]
is block-lower triangular; is time
invariant if and only if
[
G
]
is constant along block-diagonal, i.e., Toeplitz.
The impulse response is the sequence represented by the first column of[
G
]
, and the transfer function is the λ-transform of the impulse response:
gˆ(λ) = g(0) + g(1)λ+ g(2)λ2 + · · · =
∞∑
k=0
g(k)λk.
Let ψ = Gv; then ψ(k) is can be found using the convolution equation:
ψ(k) =
k∑
l=0
g(k − l)v(l).
2.1.2 Lifting Discrete-Time Signals and Systems
Let h be the period of a base clock, and let v(k) be discrete-time signal with
period h/n where n is some positive integer. That is, v(0) occurs at time
t = 0, v(1) at t = h/n, v(2) at t = 2h/n, etc. The lifted signal v, is defined
as follows: If
v = {v(0), v(1), v(2), . . . },
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then
v =
{

v(0)
v(1)
...
v(n− 1)
 ,

v(0)
v(1)
...
v(n− 1)
 , . . .
}
.
The dimension of v(k) equals n times that of v(k), and v is regarded as
referred to the base period; that is, v(k) occurs at time t = kh. The lifting
operator L is defined to be the map v → v. Te vector representation of the
equation v = Lv when n = 2 is

v(0)
v(1)
v(2)
...
 =

I 0 0 0 0 . . .
0 I 0 0 0 . . .
0 0 I 0 0 . . .
0 0 0 I 0 . . .
0 0 0 0 I . . .
0 0 0 0 0 . . .
...
...
...
...
...


v(0)
v(1)
v(2)
...
 .
For the partition shown,
[
L
]
is neither lower-triangular nor Toeplitz; there-
fore, as a system L is non-causal and time-varying. For n = 2, L−1 is
represented as
[
L−1
]

I 0 0 0 0 0 . . .
0 I 0 0 0 0 . . .
0 0 I 0 0 0 . . .
0 0 0 I 0 0 . . .
0 0 0 0 I 0 . . .
...
...
...
...
...
...

.
It can be shown that L is norm preserving, we will not present this result
here, but it can be found in [37].
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For a discrete-time FDLTI system G with underlying period h/n, lifting
the input and output signals so that the lifted signals correspond to the
base period h results in a lifted system G = LGL−1. Given gˆ in terms of
state-space data, gˆ(λ) =
 A B
C D
 , then
gˆ(λ) =

An An−1B An−2B . . . B
C D 0 . . . 0
CA CB D . . . 0
...
...
...
...
CAn−1 CAn−2B CAn−3B . . . D

, (2.1)
which is easy to prove.
Next we present how to find the state space description of dual rate sys-
tems, which is used many times in this thesis. Consider P = LSfPcH, where
H is the hold function operating at a rate of h, and Sf is the sampling
function operating at a faster rate h/n. Let Pc be given by
Pc =
 A B
C D
 .
Let Af and Bf be the fast discretization of A and B, and As and Bs be the
slow discretization of A and B, i.e.,
As := e
Ah, Af := e
Ah/n,
Bs :=
∫ h
0
eAτBdτ, Bf :=
∫ h/n
0
eAτBdτ.
Working on P , we get P = LSfPcH = L(SfPcHf )SfH; this is because
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HfSfH = H. The matrix representation of SfH is
[
SfH
]
=

I 0
...
...
I 0
n
0 I
...
...
0 I
n
. . .

.
From this and
[
L
]
it can be inferred that
LSfH =

I
...
I
 , (n blocks),
that is
SfH = L−1

I
...
I
 .
Therefore, P = L(SfPcHf )L−1

I
...
I
 , using the results from (2.1), we get the
following:
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P =

As A
n−1
f Bf A
n−2
f Bf . . . Bf
C D 0 . . . 0
CAf CBf D . . . 0
...
...
...
...
CAn−1f CA
n−2
f Bf CA
n−3
f B . . . D


I
I
...
I

=

As Bs
C D
CAf CBf +D
...
...
CAn−1f CA
n−2
f Bf + · · ·+ CBf +D

.
2.2 System Zeros
Definition 1. z0 is a zero of G(z) = C(zI−A)−1B+D if the rank of G(z0)
is less than the normal rank of G(z).
2.2.1 Computing Zeros
The state-space equations of a system may be written as
P (z)
x
u
 =
0
y
 , P (z) =
zI − A −B
C D
 .
The zeros are the values z = z0 for which P (z) loses rank, resulting in a
zero output for some non-zero input. Numerically, the zeros are found as
non-trivial solutions (with uz 6= 0 and xz 6= 0) to the following problem:
(zIg −M)
xz
uz
 = 0, M =
A B
C D
 , Ig =
I 0
0 0
 ,
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where uz is the zero input direction, and xz is the associated state initial
condition.
2.2.2 Remarks on Zeros
• In the time domain, the presence of zeros implies blocking of certain
input signals. If z0 is a zero G(z), then there exists an input signal of
the form uzz
−k
0 where uz is the zero input direction, and a set of initial
conditions xz such that y(k) = 0 for k > 0.
• There are no zeros if the outputs y contain direct information about all
the states (example y = x). More generally, there are no zeros if rank
C = n (n is the states dimension) and D = 0.
• Zeros usually appear when there are fewer inputs or outputs than
states, or when D 6= 0. Consider m×m plant G(z) = C(zI−A)−1B+D
with n states. We then have for the number of (finite) zeros of G(z)
– D 6= 0 : At most n−m + rank(D) zeros.
– D = 0 : At most n− 2m + rank(CB) zeros.
– D = 0 and rank(CB) = m : Exactly n−m zeros.
• Zeros in the input-output map of connected network systems exist un-
der certain conditions even if the dynamics of the single nodes have no
zeros [45].
• Discretization introduces unstable zeros under certain conditions (fast
sampling and relative degree of the continuous-time plant is greater
than two) even if the continuous-time plant is minimum phase [46].
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2.3 Strong Observability, Strong Detectability and
Unknown Input Observers
Consider the following discrete linear time-invariant system:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k)
y(k) = Cx(k) +Du(k)
(2.2)
Definition 2. (Strong Observability). A linear system of the form (2.2) is
said to be strongly observable if, for any initial state x(0) and any unknown
sequence of inputs u(0), u(1), . . . , there is a positive integer L such that x(0)
can be recovered from the outputs y(0), y(1), . . . , y(L).
To relate the concept of strong observability to the system matrices, if we
simply iterate the output equation in (2.2) for L+ 1 time-steps, we get:

y(0)
y(1)
y(2)
...
y(L)

=

C
CA
CA2
...
CAL−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
OL
x(0)+

D 0 0 . . . 0
CB D 0 . . . 0
CAB CB D . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
CAL−1B CAL−2B CAL−3B
... D

︸ ︷︷ ︸
JL

u(0)
u(1)
u(2)
...
u(L)

.
Theorem 3. Consider the system (2.2) with x(k) ∈ Rn. The system is
strongly observable if and only if
rank([OL JL]) = n+ rank(JL)
for some L ≤ n. [39].
Theorem 4. Consider the system (2.2). The system is strongly observable
if and only if the system has no invariant zeros [40, 39].
Definition 5. (Strong Detectability) The linear system (2.2) is strongly de-
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tectable if y(k) = 0 for all k implies that x(k)→ 0.
Theorem 6. Consider the system (2.2). The system is strongly detectable if
and only if the system is strictly minimum phase [40, 39].
We consider an observer of the form
xˆ(k + 1) = Exˆ(k) + Fy(k : k + L). (2.3)
Definition 7. The system (2.3) is said to be an unknown input observer of
the states in (2.2) with delay L if xˆ(k)− x(k) → 0 as k →∞, regardless of
the u(k).
Theorem 8. The system in (2.2) has an unknown input observer (possibly
with delay) if and only if (2.2) is strongly detectable [39].
2.4 Controller Parameterization
Definition 9. (Coprime Factorization): A doubly coprime factorization of
P is a set of maps N,M, N˜, M˜ , with P = NM−1 = M˜−1N˜ satisfying X˜ −Y˜
−N˜ M˜
M Y
N X
 = I
for some stable X, Y, X˜, Y˜ . Further, M and N are referred to as right co-
prime factors while M˜ and N˜ are referred to as left coprime factors of P .
Lemma 10. Let a doubly-coprime factorization of P be given as in Definition
9. Controller K stabilizes P if and only if K has a right coprime factorization
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K = Y1X
−1
1 such that the map M Y1
N X1

is stable and stably invertible.
Theorem 11. Let a doubly-coprime factorization of P be given as in Defi-
nition 9. All stabilizing controllers are given by
K = (Y −MQ)(X −NQ)−1 = (X˜ − AN˜)−1(Y˜ −QM˜),
where Q is stable.
The parameterization for when P is stable is straightforward. A doubly-
coprime factorization of P is then given by I 0
−P I
I 0
P I
 = I.
The controller parametrization is then given by
K = −Q(I − PQ)−1.
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CHAPTER 3
ON THE EXISTENCE OF UNBOUNDED
ACTUATOR AND/OR SENSOR ATTACKS
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we examine the conditions for the existence of stealthy addi-
tive signal attacks on the actuators and sensors of feedback control systems.
We define the notion of stealthiness and associate the existence of stealthy
unbounded attacks to structural properties of the control system.
3.2 System Model
Figure 3.1: The standard SD system.
We consider the physical, continuous-time, LTI plant Pc = [Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc]
of Figure 3.1 that is controlled by a digital controller K using the standard
zero order hold and sampling devices H and S respectively. In particular,
in the absence of any disturbances da and ds, the digital controller input
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u = {u(k)} converts to the continuous-time input
uc(t) = (Hu)(t) = u(k) for kT ≤ t < (k + 1)T,
where T is the hold period, and the digital output y = {y(k)} sequence is
obtained by sampling the continuous-time output yc with the same period
T , i.e.,
y(k) = (Syc)(k) = yc(kT ).
The corresponding discrete-time LTI plant P is defined by the relation y =
Pu, i.e., P = SPcH, and has a description P = [Ad, Bd, Cd, Dd] where the
state space matrices are obtained from the corresponding continuous-time as
Ad := e
AcT ∈ Rn×n, Bd :=
∫ T
0
eAcτBcdτ ∈ Rn×nu ,
Cd := Cc ∈ Rny×n, Dd := Dc ∈ Rny×nu .
(3.1)
We assume that the employed realization of the continuous plant Pc is min-
imal, which implies that the same holds true for the discrete plant P in the
absence of pathological sampling (e.g., [37]), i.e., for almost all periods T .
Also in this figure, we consider the possibility of attacks in terms of additive
disturbances da and ds respectively at the digital input u and at the output
y of P . These attacks on the digital part of the system can be on actuators
only (ds = 0), sensors only (da = 0), or on both, coordinated or not. As
they act on the cyber part of the system we allow them to be unbounded
sequences.
We assume that there is an attack detection mechanism in place that
monitors u and y and can detect an attack only if the effect of da and/or ds
on these signals is beyond a given noise level threshold θ > 0, i.e., only if∣∣∣∣∣∣
 y
u
 (k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > θ
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for some k. Note that we implicitly assume that there are other inputs such
as noise, not shown in Fig 3.1, that have some effect on u and y which is
what relates to the nonzero noise level θ. Accordingly, a stealthy attack
of interest will be the case when the attack inputs da and/or ds can grow
unbounded while maintaining their effect on u and y below the detection
limit; i.e., their effect cannot be distinguished from that of the normal noise
inputs. Specifically, if d represents any of da or ds, then the attack will be
stealthy if
lim sup
k→∞
|d(k)| =∞
while ∣∣∣∣∣∣
 y
u
 (k)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ θ
for all k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . In the sequel we consider various (unbounded) attack
scenarios and analyze the conditions of their detectability, i.e., when such
attacks can or cannot be stealthy.
Remark 12. In the following it is assumed that an attacker has knowledge
of the description of P , e.g., the transfer function P (λ) or its state space
realization. In fact, only knowledge of the unstable zero and pole locations
(and directions in case of MIMO P ) is necessary for our analysis to hold.
The attacker generates da or/and ds based only on this knowledge.
3.3 Actuator Attacks
We start with the case when only actuator attacks da are present (ds = 0)
and proceed in characterizing their effect on the monitoring vector
 y
u
.
Towards this end, let P be factored (e.g., [47, 43, 42]) as
P = M˜−1N˜ = NM−1,
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where the stable systems N˜ , M˜ and N,M are left and right coprime respec-
tively, and consider the controller K with a similar coprime factorization
as
K = X˜−1Y˜ = Y X−1.
The mappings from da to y and u are given respectively as (I−PK)−1P and
K(I − PK)−1P . Given that K stabilizes P , it holds that
M˜X − N˜Y =: W
is a stable and stably invertible map (unit). Moreover, it can be easily
checked that y
u
 =
 (I − PK)−1P
K(I − PK)−1P
 da =
 X
Y
W−1N˜da. (3.2)
As X and Y are right coprime and W is a unit, it follows that a stealthy
attack is possible if and only if N˜da is bounded for an unbounded da. That
is, when
lim sup
k→∞
|da(k)| =∞
it holds that ∥∥∥∥∥∥
 y
u
∥∥∥∥∥∥ <∞
if and only if ∥∥∥N˜da∥∥∥ <∞.
The following proposition is a direct consequence of the previous analysis.
Proposition 13. Let P be a “tall” system, i.e., the number of outputs is
greater than or equal to the number of inputs. Assume further that P (λ) has
no zero on the unit circle |λ| = 1. Then, an (unbounded) actuator stealthy
attack is possible if and only if P (λ) has a non-minimum phase zero other
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than at λ = 0, i.e., a zero for 0 < |λ| < 1.
Proof. Note that the unstable zeros of P are zeros of N˜ . Assume that
P (z0)d0 = 0,
where 0 < |z0| < 1 and d0 6= 0 is the zero direction of z0 which can be chosen
with |d0| = 1. So we have that
N˜(z0)d0 = 0
and consequently any input
da(k) = d0z0
−k
will lead via Equation (3.2) to∥∥∥∥∥∥
 y
u
∥∥∥∥∥∥ < C0
where the constant C0 > 0, depends on the closed loop maps. For example,
C0 could be taken as
C0 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 (I − P (λ)K(λ))
−1P (λ)d0 11−(λ/z0)
K(λ)(I − P (λ)K(λ))−1P (λ)d0 11−(λ/z0)

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ .
Thus, if  is small enough, e.g., 0 <  < θ
C0
, the input remains undetected.
To prove the reverse, note that if P has no unstable zeros, then the same
holds for N˜ and thus
∥∥∥N˜da∥∥∥ <∞ implies that ‖da‖ <∞, so no unbounded
stealthy attacks are possible.
Remark 14. We remark here that if P has zeros on the boundary |λ| = 1
with multiplicity one but no other unstable zeros (other than at λ = 0), then
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unbounded stealthy attacks are not possible. Indeed, if z0 is a simple zero with
|z0| = 1, then the corresponding input that can be masked (“zeroed out”) is
of the form da(k) = d0z0
−k which is bounded with |da(k)| < , and becomes
undetected for small enough . But this case is uninteresting, as the distur-
bance has a level of noise (which can be taken care by any reasonably robust
controller). On the other hand, if there are more than one multiplicities, un-
bounded stealthy attacks are possible. For example, if P is SISO and z0 = 1
is a zero with multiplicity 2, then an unbounded input of the form da(k) = k,
k = 0, 1, . . . remains undetected for small enough . More generally, in the
MIMO case when a zero at the boundary has multiplicity greater than one,
one has to check the Smith-McMillan form of P (λ) for invariant factors with
multiplicity greater than one corresponding to these zeros: unbounded stealthy
attacks are possible if and only if there are such factors.
Remark 15. When there is a zero of P at λ = 0 there is no corresponding
(causal) input signal to be “zeroed out.”
The case when P is “fat”, i.e. when the number of outputs in y is less
than the number of inputs in u, is always conducive to stealthy attacks as
one input can mask the effect of the other. Indeed, consider a two-input one-
output P = [P1 P2]; the effect of attacks at the individual control channels
da1 and da2 on the output y is
y = P1da1 + P2da2 + [P1 P2]u,
and thus, picking for example,
da2 = −P−12 P1da1
with da1 arbitrary and unbounded leads to y = [P1 P2]u, i.e., complete mask-
ing of the attacks. 1
1Strictly speaking, P−12 may not exist if P2 is strictly proper , i.e., P2 has a zero at λ = 0;
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3.4 Sensor Attacks
The case of sensor-only attack ds 6= 0, da = 0 can be viewed in a similar
spirit. In particular, by considering coprime factorizations for P and K as
before, the effect of ds on the monitor vector is as y
u
 =
 (I − PK)−1
K(I − PK)−1
 ds =
 X
Y
W−1M˜ds. (3.3)
Therefore, using the same rationale as in the previous case, we can claim
that an attack is detectable if and only if there are no ds with ‖ds‖ =∞ and∥∥∥M˜ds∥∥∥ <∞. This in turn means that attacks are detectable if and only if M˜
has no unstable zeros, which is equivalent to P being a stable system. More
specifically, we have the following which can be proved as in the Proposition
13.
Proposition 16. Assume that P (λ) has no pole on the unit circle |λ| = 1.
Then, a sensor stealthy attack is possible if and only if P (λ) has a pole with
|λ| < 1.
Regarding poles of P (λ) on the boundary (|λ| = 1), similar remarks hold
as in the actuator attack case. Namely, if these poles are simple then there
is no stealthy attack. If they have multiplicities, then their multiplicities in
the corresponding invariant factors in the Smith-McMillan form determine
whether stealthy attacks are possible.
3.5 Coordinated Actuator Sensor Attacks
In the case when a coordination of actuator and sensor attack is possible,
unbounded stealthy attacks are always possible even in the case where P
but one can always pick da1(λ) = λd¯a1(λ) with d¯a1 unbounded and make (P
−1
2 P1da1)(λ)
meaningful, i.e., corresponding to a sequence {da1(k)} defined for nonnegative integers k.
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Figure 3.2: Coordinated actuator and sensor attacks.
is stable and minimum phase. Indeed, in this case the effect of da can be
completely masked by canceling its effect at the output via ds: just pick
ds = −Pda
with da arbitrary and unbounded, then y = Pu, as depicted in Figure 3.2.
Therefore, unless there are outputs that are not attacked, this situation is
not of interest as there is no hope to detect the attack. If there are such
attack-free outputs, then the problem reverts to the actuator-only attack
case, with these outputs used for analysis and design.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced a sampled-data framework to study the effect
of attacks on cyber-physical systems. We defined the attack detection mech-
anism and derived the input-output maps for actuator and sensor attacks on
the monitoring signals. We showed that unbounded stealthy actuator attacks
are related to the open-loop discrete plant unstable zeros, while unbounded
stealthy sensor attacks are related to the open-loop discrete plant unstable
poles. We also showed that coordinated actuator and sensor attacks can al-
ways be designed to be stealthy and unbounded regardless of the locations
of poles and zeros of the plant.
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CHAPTER 4
DUAL RATE CONTROL FOR DETECTING
UNBOUNDED ACTUATOR ATTACKS
4.1 Introduction
Multirate sampling has been studied extensively in the context of sampled-
data control in the past and many relevant analysis and synthesis results
were obtained (e.g., [48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55]). An interesting property
of multirate sampling is its ability to remove certain unstable zeros of the
discrete-time system when viewed in the lifted LTI domain, which in turn
allows for fulfilling certain potential design requirements such as gain margin
levels, or strong stabilization, that are not possible to satisfy with single rate.
We plan to utilize this property and study in detail in the context of stealthy
attack detection. We show that the proposed dual rate control structure
removes all the vulnerabilities to unbounded stealthy actuator attacks. This
is shown to hold also when the plant has more controls than measurements
(i.e., a “fat” plant). We show that if a single measurement output remains
secure, and if the modes of the system are observable from this output, then
dual rate systems always provide the ability to detect actuator as well as
combined sensor-actuator attacks.
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Figure 4.1: A dual rate SD system.
4.2 Analysis of Dual Rate Control Systems with
Respect to Detecting Stealthy Actuator
Unbounded Attacks
We consider the SD scheme of Figure 4.1 (temporarily without any distur-
bances) where the output is sampled with period T/m, where m is a suffi-
ciently large integer, i.e., y(k) = (Smyc)(t) := yc(kT/m). To this end, let the
corresponding discrete-time system mapping u to y be
G = SmPcH.
For this MR discrete system we have that
ΛmG = GΛ,
where Λ is the 1-step right shift operator on discrete sequences {x(k)}, i.e.,
(Λx)(k + 1) = x(k) with (Λx)(0) = 0. Using standard lifting techniques
(e.g., [37]) one can obtain a shift invariant (LTI) description G˜ of the discrete
dynamics by grouping the plant input and output signals as u˜(k) = u(k) and
y˜(k) = [y′c(kT/m) y
′
c((k + 1)T/m) . . . y
′
c((k + m− 1)T/m)]′ (similarly for d˜a
and d˜s). A state space description for G˜ can be obtained from the original
system.
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Define state space matrices
A := eAcT/m ∈ Rn×n, B :=
∫ T/m
0
eAcτBcdτ ∈ Rn×nu ,
C := Cc ∈ Rny×n, D := Dc ∈ Rny×nu .
Then
G˜ =
 A˜ B˜
C˜ D˜
 , (4.1)
where
A˜ = Am ∈ Rn×n, B˜ =
m−1∑
k=0
AkB ∈ Rn×nu ,
C˜ =

C
CA
...
CAm−1
 ∈ R
mny×n,
D˜ =

D
CB +D
...
C
∑m−2
k=0 A
kB +D
 ∈ R
mny×nu .
Also, it becomes useful to define a discrete-time system
Pm :=
 A B
C D
 .
This system corresponds to the single-rate sampling and hold scheme of the
original plant Pc with a period of T/m, i.e., Pm = SmPcHm where Hm is
accordingly generating a continuous signal uc from the discrete u as uc(t) =
(Hmu)(t) = u(k) for kT/m ≤ t < (k + 1)T/m. It is clear that Pm has the
same dimension as Pc; i.e., it maps nu inputs to ny outputs. Moreover, given
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Figure 4.2: The lifted system.
that Pc holds a controllable and observable realization, and the sampling
is not pathological, it follows that the inherited realization of Pm is also
controllable and observable. Based on our assumptions on the sampling, it
is also easily verified that the realization of G˜ as above is controllable and
observable. Let M˜G˜ and N˜G˜ be the left coprime factors of G˜. We will use
the state-space realization of N˜G˜ as
N˜G˜ =
 A˜+HC˜ B˜ +HD˜
C˜ D˜
 , (4.2)
where H is chosen such that A˜+HC˜ is Schur stable. It is easy to show that G˜
and N˜G˜ have the same non-minimum phase zeros. We consider now the closed
loop in the lifted domain in Figure 4.2 where the controller is K˜ and proceed
to argue that the lifted loop is not susceptible to stealthy actuator attacks
d˜a, and thus the original MR loop of Figure 4.1 is not susceptible either. To
this end, the integer m is chosen such that the following assumptions are
satisfied.
Assumption 17. The matrix B is full column rank.
Assumption 18. The matrix O : =

C
CA
...
CAm−2
 is full column rank.
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The first assumption is standard and holds generically if Bc is full column
rank in the continuous system. The second assumption holds for large enough
m, in particular m = n+ 1, if the pair (A,C) is observable, which is true as
Pm is minimal. It can also hold, however, even with a small m generically.
Also, if Assumption 18 holds, G˜ is a tall system. Then the following lemma
characterizes the zeros of G˜.
Lemma 19. Consider the lifted system G˜ as in (4.1) together with Assump-
tions (17) and (18). Then G˜ has at most one non-minimum phase zero and
is located at λ = 1.
Proof. Since N˜G˜ and G˜ have the same non-minimum phase zeros, we will
prove this lemma for N˜G˜. Notice that since N˜G˜ is tall, |λ0| ≤ 1 is a zero if
and only if there exists a non-zero vector ν ∈ Rnu such that
N˜G˜ (λ0) ν =[
λ0C˜
[
I − λ0
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 (
B˜ +HD˜
)
+ D˜
]
ν = 0.
Notice that [
I − λ0
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1
is well-defined as all the eigenvalues of A˜ + HC˜ are inside the unit circle.
Now, let
ξ =
[
I − λ0
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 (
B˜ +HD˜
)
ν.
Then, pre-multiplying by
[
I − λ0
(
A˜+HC˜
)]
and using
λ0C˜ξ + D˜ν = 0,
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we get
λ0C˜ξ + D˜ν = 0, (4.3)(
I − λ0A˜
)
ξ − B˜ν = 0. (4.4)
Pre-multiplying (4.3) by X, where X is a matrix in R(m−1)ny×mny given as
X =

I −I 0 · · · 0
0 I −I
...
. . . . . .
0 · · · 0 I −I
 . (4.5)
we get
λ0XC˜ξ +XD˜ν = O [λ0 (I − A) ξ −Bν] = 0.
Since O is full column rank by Assumption 18, it holds true that
λ0 (A− I) ξ +Bν = 0,
which together with (4.4) gives
[(
I − λ0A˜
)
B + λ0 (A− I) B˜
]
ν = 0.
Simplifying further yields
(1− λ0)Bν = 0.
Therefore, if ν is nonzero then λ0 = 1 since, by Assumption 17, B is full
column rank.
According to Lemma 19, the lifted system, G˜, has no zeros inside the unit
circle. However, it may have a zero at λ = 1. Based on Proposition 13 and
Remark 14, an (unbounded) actuator stealthy attack will not be possible if
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λ = 1 is zero of G˜ with multiplicity of at most one. Indeed, this is the case
as it is proved in the following theorem:
Theorem 20. Consider the dual rate SD scheme as in Figure 4.2. Then,
there does not exist any (unbounded) actuator stealthy attack if Assumptions
17 and 18 are met.
Proof. As discussed before, we need to show that λ = 1 is a zero of G˜ or
equivalently N˜G˜ with the multiplicity of at most one. It can be argued that
([42]-Section 6.5) λ = 1 is a zero of algebraic multiplicity greater than one if
and only if the matrix
T :=
 N˜G˜ (1) 0
d
dλ
N˜G˜ (λ) |λ=1 N˜G˜ (1)

has a right null chain; that is, there exists a vector
ν =
 ν1
ν2
 ,
with ν1 6= 0, such that Tν = 0. By the way of contradiction, we will show
that if Tν = 0 then ν1 = 0. Direct calculations show that if Tν = 0 then[
C˜
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 (
B˜ +HD˜
)
+ D˜
]
ν1 = 0, (4.6)
[
C˜
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−2 (
B˜ +HD˜
)]
ν1
+
[
C˜
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 (
B˜ +HD˜
)
+ D˜
]
ν2 = 0. (4.7)
Define
ξ1 =
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 (
B˜ +HD˜
)
ν1,
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ξ2 =
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]−1 [
ξ1 +
(
B˜ +HD˜
)
ν2
]
.
Pre-multiplying ξ1 and ξ2 by
[
I −
(
A˜+HC˜
)]
and grouping terms we get
(
I − A˜
)
ξ1 − B˜ν1 = H
(
C˜ξ1 + D˜ν1
)
, (4.8)
−ξ1 +
(
I − A˜
)
ξ2 − B˜ν2 = H
(
C˜ξ2 + D˜ν2
)
. (4.9)
From (4.6)-(4.9),
C˜ξ1 + D˜ν1 = 0, (4.10)
C˜ξ2 + D˜ν2 = 0, (4.11)(
I − A˜
)
ξ1 − B˜ν1 = 0, (4.12)
−ξ1 +
(
I − A˜
)
ξ2 − B˜ν2 = 0. (4.13)
Furthermore, pre-multiplying (4.10) and (4.11) gives
XC˜ξ1 +XD˜ν1 = O [(I − A) ξ1 −Bν1] = 0,
XC˜ξ2 +XD˜ν2 = O [(I − A) ξ2 −Bν2] = 0,
where X is as in (4.5), which in turn imply
(I − A) ξ1 −Bν1 = 0, (4.14)
(I − A) ξ2 −Bν2 = 0. (4.15)
Eliminating ξ2 between (4.13) and (4.15), we get
− (I − A) ξ1 −
[
(I − A) B˜ −
(
I − A˜
)
B
]
ν2 = 0.
Notice that (I − A) B˜ −
(
I − A˜
)
B = 0 and hence the last equation implies
(I − A) ξ1 = 0,
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which in turn, together with (4.14), implies Bν1 = 0. By Assumption 17,
Bν1 = 0 implies ν1 = 0 and this completes the proof.
As a final comment from the previous analysis, we offer conditions when G˜
has a zero λ = 1. We note that, as proved in the previous theorem, these zeros
are not a problem since they cannot generate unbounded stealthy attacks.
Proposition 21. Let Pc be “tall.” Then G˜ has a zero at λ = 1 if and only
if Pm does.
Proof. Suppose G˜ has a zero at λ = 1. Then, there exist vectors ξ and ν,
at least one of them nonzero, such that (4.3) and (4.4) hold for λ0 = 1. In
particular, from (4.3) we get
Cξ +Dν = 0. (4.16)
Furthermore, pre-multiplying (4.3) by X results in
O [(I − A) ξ −Bν] = 0
which in turn implies
(I − A) ξ −Bν = 0. (4.17)
(4.16) and (4.17) imply that Pm has a zero at λ = 1.
Conversely, if Pm has a zero at λ = 1, I − A −B
C D
 ξ
ν
 = 0, (4.18)
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for some ξ and ν. Pre-multiplying it by
∑m−1
k=1 A
k 0
0 I
−C I
−C − CA I
...
−C∑m−2k=0 Ak I

(4.19)
gives  I − A˜ −B˜
C˜ D˜
 ξ
ν
 = 0.
That is, G˜ has a zero at λ = 1.
Proposition 22. Let Pc be “fat.” Then G˜ has always a zero at λ = 1.
Proof. The proof relies on the fact that since Pc or equivalently Pm is fat,
there always exist two vectors ξ and ν with at least one of them nonzero such
that (4.18) holds. Then, the rest of the proof follows similarly to that of the
converse part of Proposition 21.
Remark 23. We would like to point out that an equivalent way of obtaining
the same results, i.e., ability to detect zero attacks, is to hold the control input
longer rather than sampling the output faster. That is, if we consider a dual
rate system where the hold operates with a period of mT while the output
is sampled with T , then the corresponding lifted system will enjoy the same
properties as before in terms of unstable zeros. Obviously, the (nominal)
controller performance will be reduced as the control is slower. On the other
hand, there is a potential benefit of lower cost of actuation in this case. An
example offered in the next session illustrates this point.
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4.3 Examples
In this section we provide examples of systems that are vulnerable to zero
dynamics attacks, and then we apply the techniques presented in the previous
sections to remove these vulnerabilities. Using one of the examples, we also
present an approach to perform controller design trade-offs.
4.3.1 Quadruple-Tank
This example is a Quadruple-Tank Process (QTP) [56] that was used for
system security analysis in [57]. The continuous-time nonlinear plant model
is given by
h˙1(t) = − a1
A1
√
2gh1(t) +
a3
A1
√
2gh3(t) +
γ1k1
A1
u1(t)
h˙2(t) = − a2
A2
√
2gh2(t) +
a4
A1
√
2gh4(t) +
γ2k2
A2
u2(t)
h˙3(t) = − a3
A3
√
2gh3(t) +
(1− γ2)k2
A3
u2(t)
h˙4(t) = − a4
A4
√
2gh4(t) +
(1− γ1)k1
A4
u1(t),
where Ai is the cross-section area tank i, ai the cross-section area of the outlet
hole, hi the height of water in tank i, ki is pump constants, γi the flow ratios
and g the gravity acceleration. We regard the outputs as the water levels of
tanks 1 and 2, i.e. h1 and h2. The voltage applied to pump i is ui, and the
corresponding flow is kiui. At a certain operating condition, the system is
linearized and sampled at T = 0.5 sec to get the following discrete-time open
39
loop system [57]:
Ad =

0.975 0 0.042 0
0 0.977 0 0.044
0 0 0.958 0
0 0 0 0.956
 ,
Bd =

0.00515 0.0016
0.0019 0.00447
0 0.0737
0.0850 0
 , Cd =
0.2 0 0 0
0 0.2 0 0
 , Dd =
0
0
 .
The discrete system has an unstable zero at λ = 0.97 with direction ν =[
0 0 1 −0.96
]′
which indicates that stealthy actuator attacks of the form
da(k) = ν(.97)
−k are possible. Next, we apply multirate control to move the
unstable zero outside the unit circle. We sample faster at rate T = 0.5/2 =
0.25 sec while keeping the hold at rate T = 0.5 sec. The resulting open loop
state space representation after lifting is
A˜ = Ad, B˜ = Bd,
C˜ =

0.2 0 0 0
0 0.2 0 0
0.1975 0 0.0043 0
0 0.1977 0 0.0045
 ,
D˜ =

0 0
0 0
0.005183 8.095e− 005
9.437e− 005 0.004496
 .
The new open loop system has no unstable zeros, which indicates that it is
not susceptible to stealthy actuator attacks. We note that only a small m
is enough to accomplish our goal, i.e., m = 2. In fact, Assumption 18, a
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sufficient condition for Theorem 13 to hold, is not even satisfied in this case
and yet the unstable zeros are removed. We also note that the unstable zero
at the single rate system was due to the unstable zero of the continuous time
dynamics. On top of physical unstable zeros, sampling can create additional
ones as indicated in the following power system example, where a simulation
of a stealthy attack is shown.
4.3.2 Automatic Voltage Regulator
The automatic voltage regulator (AVR), or the generator excitation control,
specifies the terminal voltage magnitude of a synchronous generator by con-
trolling the reactive power. A simplified block diagram of a linearized AVR
is shown in Figure 4.3 [58]. An increase in the reactive power load of the
generator results in a drop in the voltage magnitude across its terminals.
The voltage drop is sensed by a potential transformer and then is rectified
and compared to the reference voltage magnitude. The error signal is then
amplified and raises the generator terminal voltage by controlling the exci-
tation field. For a set of typical system parameters KA = 10, τA = 0.1, KE =
1, τe = 0.4, Kg = 1, τg = 1, Kr = 1, τr = 0.05 as in Figure 4.3, the open loop
state space representation of the single rate system after discretization at a
sample rate T = 0.5 sec is
Ad =

0.0105 0.3949 3.86 2.869
−0.0057 −0.1817 −1.369 −0.587
0.00117 0.03359 0.1793 −0.4597
0.00092 0.03197 0.3163 0.8918
 ,
Bd =

−0.005738
0.001174
0.0009193
0.0002165
 , Cd =
[
0 0 0 5000
]
, Dd =
[
0
]
,
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Figure 4.3: A simplified automatic voltage regulator block diagram.
which has an unstable zero at λ = −0.7045. We note that although the
continuous system has no unstable zeros, sampling at the relatively slow rate
of 0.5 sec per sample created an unstable zero. Next, we consider an attack
input of the form da(k) = z0
−k, where  is a small number and z0 is the zero
of the system. Figures 4.4a–4.4c show a plot of the attack held at T = 0.5
sec along with the states and the sampled output of the system. We can
notice that while the states of the system are exploding, the sampled output
remains zero and no attack is detected. Next, we change the single rate
block diagram to a multirate architecture to move the unstable zero to the
safe region. We sample faster at rate T/m = 0.5/2 = 0.25 sec per sample
while keeping the hold at rate T = 0.5 sec. The resulting open loop state
space representation after lifting is
A˜ = Ad, B˜ = Bd, C˜ =
 0 0 0 5000
2.185 86.13 1092 4902
 , D˜ =
 0
0.196
 .
The resulting open loop system has no unstable zeros. We note that only a
small m is enough to accomplish our goal, i.e., m = 2. Again, Assumption 18,
a sufficient condition for Theorem 13 to hold, is not even satisfied in this case
and yet the unstable zeros are removed. We consider the same attack input
as above and simulate the system. The sampled output at rate T = 0.25 sec
is shown in Figure 4.4d. It is obvious that the multirate scheme detects the
42
(a) Zero order hold of zero dynamics at-
tack da.
(b) States of AVR under zero dynamics
attack.
(c) Sampled output of AVR using single
rate control.
(d) Sampled output of AVR using dual
rate control.
Figure 4.4: (a)-(c) show simulation of zero dynamics attack on a sampled-
data AVR system under single rate control. (d) Shows the sampled output
under dual rate control.
attack on the system.
4.3.3 Automatic Generation Control
The main objectives of any AGC system are to maintain the frequency of
the grid and to maintain the power interchanges between neighboring areas
at their scheduled values. This is achieved by controlling the units partici-
pating in AGC to follow the load profile and correct for errors in the load
forecast. Figure 4.5 shows a load frequency control (LFC) block diagram of
a single machine [59], [58]. A change in frequency (∆ω) is sensed by the
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governor, which in turn orders the turbine to raise or lower the generation
of electric power until the frequency is stabilized. The figure shows what is
called primary frequency control augmented with a secondary controller K
to make sure the error in frequency settles to zero. The open loop state space
representation of the single rate AGC system after discretization at a sample
rate T = 0.5 sec is
d
dt

∆ω
∆Pmech
∆Pvalve
 =

0.78 0.03 0.008
−8.34 0.23 0.163
−16.17 −0.42 −0.019


∆ω
∆Pmech
∆Pvalve

+

0.009
0.424
0.832
∆Pref
y =
[
1 0 0
]
∆ω
∆Pmech
∆Pvalve
 ,
which has an unstable zero at λ = −0.5721. We consider an attack input of
the form da(k) = z0
−k where  is a small number and z0 is the zero of the
system. Figures 4.6a–4.6c show plots of the attack held at 0.5 sec along with
the states and the continuous and sampled output of the system. Next, we
change the single rate block diagram to a multirate architecture to move the
unstable zero to the safe region. We sample faster at rate T/m = 0.5/2 = 0.25
sec per sample while keeping the hold at rate T = 0.5 sec. The resulting open
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Figure 4.5: A simplified automatic generation control block diagram.
loop state space representation after lifting is
y =
 1 0 0
0.9462 0.01925 0.003557


∆ω
∆Pmech
∆Pvalve

+
 0
0.001711
∆Pref ,
where A and B stay the same. For the multirate scheme, we consider the
same attack input as above and simulate the system. The sampled output
at rate T = 0.25 sec is shown in Figure 4.6d. The simulation shows that the
multirate scheme detects the attack on the system.
4.3.4 Controller Trade-Offs
In this section we consider the automatic voltage regulation system previ-
ously discussed in order to investigate trade-offs in the controller design. In
particular, we will close the control loop by designing linear quadratic Gaus-
sian (LQG) controllers for the dual rate system and compare the cost with
that of single rate LQG controllers. We set up a baseline LQG formulation
for the dynamics of the open loop AVR with sampled measurements with a
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(a) Zero order hold of zero dynamics at-
tack da
(b) States of AGC under zero dynamics
attack
(c) Sampled output of AGC using single
rate control
(d) Sampled output of AGC using dual
rate control
Figure 4.6: (a)-(c) show simulation of zero dynamics attack on a sampled-
data AGC system under single rate control. (d) shows the sampled output
under dual rate control.
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period s as
dx(t) = Acx(t)dt+ ωc(t)dt+Bcuc(t)dt,
y(k) = Ccx(ks) + v(k), k = 0, 1, . . .
We assume that the process noise {ωc(t), t ≥ 0} is a Brownian motion with
E{dωc(t)dωc(t)′} = Ξc, the observation noise {v(k), k = 0, 1...} is a zero mean
white Gaussian sequence with covariance Θ = E{v(k)v(k)′}, and x(0) is zero
mean Gaussian with covariance S0 = E{x(0)x(0)′}. Moreover, it is assumed
that the random variables x(0), v(k), ωc(t) are independent. We assume that
the hold period is h. The objective is to minimize the following cost:
J = E
{
lim sup
k→∞
(1/kh)
∫ kh
0
(x′Qcx+ ucRcu′c)dt
}
with the usual positive definiteness conditions Qc = Q
′
c ≥ 0 and Rc = R′c > 0,
which transforms to
J = E
{
lim sup
k→∞
(1/k)
∞∑
k=0
(x′kQxk + 2x
′
kSuk + u
′
kRuk)
}
with xk := x(kh), uk := uc(kh) and
Q =
∫ h
0
eA
′
cτQce
Acτdτ
S =
∫ h
0
eA
′
ctQc
( ∫ t
0
eAc(t−τ)Bcdτ
)
dt
Ξ =
∫ s
0
eAc(s−τ)BcΞcB′ce
A′c(s−τ)dτ
R =
∫ h
0
[( ∫ t
0
B′ce
A′c(t−τ)dτ
)
Qc
( ∫ t
0
eAc(t−τ)Bcdτ
)
+Rc
]
dt.
The hold and sample periods h and s are assumed to be integer related
and in particular h = ms with m = 1, 2, . . . . In this synchronous dual rate
case, rather than using lifting techniques to solve the problem, we take the
separation principle approach which applies also to asynchronous sampling
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Table 4.1: LQG Cost
s\h 0.5 1
0.25 0.6704 0.6705
0.5 0.6868 0.6877
1 0.7033 0.7047
(e.g., [60]) to find the optimal cost by computing
Jo = trace
[
PF ′(R +B′hX)BhF +XΞ
]
,
where X and P are the unique positive semidefinite symmetric solutions of
the algebraic Riccati equations
X = A′hXAh − (S + A′hBhX)(R +B′hXBh)−1(XB′hAh + S ′) +Q
P = AsPA
′
s − AsPC ′s(CsPC ′s + Θ)−1CsPA′s + Ξ
and
F = (B′hXBh +R)
−1(B′hXAh + S
′),
where the various A, B, C matrices above are corresponding to the matrices
in Equation (3.1) for T = h and T = s, i.e., Ah = e
Ach, As = e
Acs, etc.
Table 4.1 summarizes the LQG cost for different single rate and dual rate
sample and hold for the case Ξc = 10
3, Θ = 10, Qc = I4 and Rc = I. The
entries (s, h) for which stealthy attacks are not possible are (0.25, 0.5), (0.25,
1), and (0.5, 1). We notice that, because of faster sampling, we get better
performance in dual rate control than single rate control. Also, as expected,
we get better performance between dual rate controllers when we increase the
rate of sampling rather than decreasing the rate of the zero order hold. Faster
sampling, however, may require more expensive devices and so a trade-off is
present.
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4.4 Conclusion
We presented a simple dual rate sampled data scheme which guarantees de-
tectability of unbounded actuator and/or sensor attacks, if a secure output
that maintains observability of the open loop modes is available. The main
observation is that the sampled data nature in the implementation of the
cyber-physical system cannot be ignored as sampling can generate additional
vulnerabilities due to the extra unstable zeros it may introduce, particularly
if high rates are necessary to achieve certain performance level. The pro-
posed method solves this issue by the use of multirate sampling that ensures
that zeros exist only in harmless locations in the lifted domain. A few ex-
amples were also presented that show how the multirate scheme detects the
unbounded actuator attacks. In addition, the examples incorporated a dual
rate controller cost comparison based on LQG control.
Several other possibilities can be studied in this context. The use of asyn-
chronous sampling (e.g., [49, 61]) can provide alternative ways to detect
stealthy attacks; or even the network’s random delays can be helpful in that
respect. The speed of detecting, however, needs to be taken into considera-
tion, even if the attack is detectable. The methods of generalized holds [62]
are also relevant as they move zeros, and with careful analysis of their robust-
ness properties (e.g., [63, 64]) can provide acceptable and simple solutions as
well.
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CHAPTER 5
ON THE COMPUTATION OF WORST
ATTACKS: AN LP FRAMEWORK
5.1 Introduction
In this work, we consider signal attacks where the general problem from the
attacker’s perspective is to find the attack input d = {d(k)} so that it is
stealthy while inflicting the maximum damage on the performance variable
z = {z(k)}. We showed in the previous chapters that unbounded attacks for
LTI systems are related to the unstable zeros and/or poles of the open loop
system. However, in this chapter we consider the problem of characterizing
the worst bounded and stealthy attacks. This problem involves a maximiza-
tion of a convex function subject to convex constraints. We propose different
attack resource constraints to make the problem more practical. More specif-
ically, we assume that the attacker has a finite time window {0, 1, . . . , ta} to
attack the system and inflict the maximum damage before the attack is over,
and we attempt to solve the following three attack scenarios:
• Scenario 1: Attacker can attack in a finite time window up to t = ta;
his goal is to inflict the maximum damage anywhere (before or after
ta) while remaining stealthy for all t.
• Scenario 2: Attacker can attack in a finite interval up to t = ta; his
goal is to inflict the maximum damage anywhere (before or after ta)
while remaining stealthy for t ≤ ta (does not care if detected after the
attack is over).
• Scenario 3: Attacker can attack in a finite interval up to t = ta; his goal
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is to inflict the maximum damage at t ≤ ta while remaining stealthy
for t ≤ ta.
We show that by employing a `∞ framework, tractable linear programming
(LP) methods can be used to compute the worst attack for the above three
scenarios.
Our work is closely related to [23], [25], [26], [28], [65], [66], [67] and [24].
However, we do not assume a constant d such as in [23] where they assume
the system is in steady state. In addition, the work in the mentioned ref-
erences does not address attack impact and stealthiness after the attack is
concluded, nor does it relate to either a specific detection method (e.g. resid-
ual detectors) which assumes certain thresholding mechanisms that may be
stochastic, or to a specific controller in use. We study these problems in a
more general input-output fashion that does not depend on the particular
controller used, and in a totally deterministic worst case scenario. In other
words, the assumed noise thresholds are based on the existence of a worst
case magnitude bounded noise. In this sense, the noise is allowed to “con-
spire” with the attacker to keep the detection signals within what is assumed
normal operation.
In the second part of this chapter, we build on the worst attack design
problem and provide a novel K-d controller synthesis iterative method to
minimize the performance cost without increasing the impact of the worst
attack. Each iteration is an LP and alternates between finding the worst
attack d for a given controller K, and finding the next K that minimizes the
performance cost while keeping a non-increasing upper bound on the worst
case impact inflicted by d.
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Figure 5.1: General setup of input-output maps.
5.2 Problem Setup
We consider the case of a general signal attack d on a closed loop system of
Figure 5.1. Let Φ(K) describe the effect of d on the performance variable z
and on the monitoring signal ψ, i.e. let
Φ =
Φzd
Φψd
 =: d 7→
z
ψ
 .
The monitoring signal ψ consists of the measured output y and the control
signal u; it can however contain any other information that is recorded and
measured, e.g., reference inputs. In this setup, we assume that there may
be other external disturbances and noise inputs which are normal, i.e., not
malicious attackers, which are not shown in the figure. Also, the entire
formulation deals with discrete-time systems and signals.
The attacker’s goal can be stated in general as
max
d
‖z‖∞
s.t. ‖ψ‖∞ ≤ θ,
(5.1)
where θ is an alarm threshold, associated with the afore mentioned normal
set of disturbances. In Chapter 2, we established exact conditions for stealth-
iness of unbounded actuator and sensor attacks which can totally destroy the
system. These attacks are ultimately related to the open loop plant P , and
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for LTI systems in particular, to the non-minimum phase (unstable) zeros
and unstable poles of P . We note, as pointed out in Chapter 1, that unstable
zeros can also be due to the sampled data implementation of controllers.
In this general setup of Figure 5.1, we elaborate on the existence of stealthy
unbounded attacks using an input-output approach. In particular, consider-
ing a left coprime factorization ([47, 43, 42]) for the part of the generalized
system that connects inputs to the measured output
y = Pydd+ Pu
in the open loop, we have
[Pyd P ] = M˜
−1[N˜yd N˜ ].
Using a left coprime factorization for the stabilizing controller K = Y X−1,
we can express
ψ =
 y
u
 =
 X
Y
W−1M˜Pydd =
 X
Y
W−1N˜ydd,
where
W = M˜X − N˜Y.
Since W is stable and, by stability of the closed loop, has a stable inverse
W−1 we have that the detectability of d depends on the unstable zeros of
N˜yd; i.e., unbounded stealthy attacks d are possible if and only if N˜yd has
unstable zeros.
For actuator-only attacks
Pyd = P = M˜
−1N˜ =⇒ N˜yd = N˜
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while for sensor-only attacks
Pyd = I = M˜
−1M˜ =⇒ N˜yd = M˜.
Hence, this shows how the unstable zeros of P (which are the unstable
zeros of N˜) and the unstable poles of P (which are the unstable zeros of
M˜) relate to the actuator and sensor attacks considered in Chapter 2. Mul-
tirate sampling can potentially remove unstable zeros of N˜yd as was shown
in Chapter 3 for unbounded actuator attacks, but it cannot work for total
sensor unbounded attacks.
In the following we consider the case of bounded in magnitude (and time)
attacks with various levels of stealth. The question we want to address is how
to compute the worst possible bounded attacks and how to defend against
such attacks by a suitable controller design.
5.3 Computation of Worst Attack
We consider the problem of computing the worst case attack in (5.1) when
the attacker has a finite time window {0, 1, . . . , ta} to attack the system.
In addition, we require the attack to remain stealthy after the attack is
over. This allows for repeatedly attacking the system without triggering the
monitoring signal alarm.
Specifically, consider the optimization problem in (5.1); we are interested in
finding the worst, stealthy, bounded (in magnitude and time) attack. Assume
the LTI closed loop system Φ(K) is stable and let tzd and tψd be design
parameters related to the decay rate of the pulse responses of of Φzd and Φψd
respectively. These parameters determine the time windows that the attacker
cares about for impact and stealthiness respectively. Suppose the intruder
can only attack the system during a finite interval {0, 1, . . . , ta}, with attack
magnitude less than or equal to α. Then, a corresponding problem of interest
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can be formulated as
max
d
‖z‖[0,ta+tzd]∞
s.t. ‖ψ‖[0,ta+tψd]∞ ≤ θ,
|d(k)| ≤ α, k = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
d(k) = 0, k = ta + 1, . . . ,
(5.2)
where
‖z‖[0,ta+tzd]∞ = max
0≤k≤ta+tzd
= |z(k)| ,
and similarly
‖ψ‖[0,ta+tψd]∞ = max
0≤k≤ta+tψd
= |ψ(k)| .
The system of equations governing the output z when subjected to the
attack input d for each instance of time is given by

z(0)
z(1)
...
z(ta)
z(ta + 1)
...
z(ta + tzd)

=

Φzd(0) 0 0 · · ·
Φzd(1) Φzd(0) 0 · · ·
...
...
...
...
Φzd(ta) Φzd(ta − 1) Φzd(ta − 2) · · ·
Φzd(ta + 1) Φzd(ta) Φzd(ta − 1) · · ·
...
...
...
...
Φzd(ta + tzd) Φzd(ta + tzd − 1) Φzd(ta + tzd − 2) · · ·


d(0)
d(1)
...
d(ta)
0
...
0

,
(5.3)
where d(k) = 0 for t > ta. The objective is to find the sequence {d(k)},
k = {0, . . . , ta} that maximizes ‖z‖[0,ta+tzd]∞ such that ‖ψ‖[0,ta+tψd]∞ ≤ θ. This
corresponds to selecting the optimal row in (5.3) to be maximized and finding
the optimal d that would maximize this row. In view of the above, the
following proposition is obvious.
Proposition 24. Problem (5.2) can be formulated as the following optimiza-
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tion problem:
max
d,n∈{0,1,...,ta+tzd}
n∑
k=0
Φzd(n− k)d(k)
s.t.
∣∣∣ τ∑
k=0
Φψd(τ − k)d(k)
∣∣∣ ≤ θ, τ = 0, 1, . . . , ta + tψd,
|d(k)| ≤ α, k = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
d(k) = 0, k = ta + 1, . . . .
(5.4)
After finding the worst case attack dˆ, the worst case impact can be obtained
by computing
∥∥∥Φzddˆ∥∥∥∞.
Note also that an optimal dˆ can always be selected so that
∣∣∣ n∑
k=0
Φzd(n− k)dˆ(k)
∣∣∣ = n∑
k=0
Φzd(n− k)dˆ(k),
thus the expression for the cost in (5.4).
Remark 25. The objective function looks for the optimal row in the set
{0, . . . , ta + tzd}. We can always choose a sufficiently long tzd, determined
by the decay rate of Φzd and the bound α on d, to ensure that we capture the
worst case ‖z‖∞ = sup
tzd
‖z‖[0,ta+tzd]∞ .
Remark 26. Note that the first set of constraints ensures the monitoring
signal ψ is below a threshold level (‖ψ‖∞ ≤ θ) during and after the attack
interval. Since we assume that Φψd is stable and that d(k) = 0 for t > ta, if
tψd is chosen long enough, depending on the decay rate of Φψd and the bound
α, one can guarantee that d is undetectable for all t. Therefore, to guarantee
stealthiness for all t it is sufficient to enforce the monitoring constraints up
to ta + tψd. The last set of constraints ensures the attack is bounded and
decays to zero at the end of the attack interval.
Remark 27. Remarks 25 and 26 basically state that for a priori computable
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tzd and tψd, problems (5.2) and (5.4) solve the following problem:
max
d
‖z‖∞
s.t. ‖ψ‖∞ ≤ θ,
|d(k)| ≤ α, k = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
d(k) = 0, k = ta + 1, . . . .
(5.5)
Remark 28. Problem (5.4) is LP for a fixed n (fixed row) which can be solved
efficiently. Fixing n transforms the objective function to a linear function
under linear (polytopic) constraints. However, one has to solve (in principle)
ta + tzd LPs.
Following is a simple search algorithm (Algorithm 1) to solve Problem 5.4:
Algorithm 1 Compute worst attack dˆ
Input Φzd, Φψd, ta, tzd, tψd, td, θ and α.
for i = 1 : ta + tzd do
Solve
max
di
i∑
k=0
Φzd(i− k)di(k)
s.t.
∣∣∣ τ∑
k=0
Φψd(τ − k)di(k)
∣∣∣ ≤ θ, τ = 0, 1, . . . , ta + tψd,
|di(k)| ≤ α, k = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
di(k) = 0, k = ta + 1, . . . , ta + td.
Compute and store ‖Φzddi‖∞
end
Compare ‖Φzddi‖∞ and determine the worst attack dˆ.
In the sequel, we consider certain cases which further simplify the compu-
tations. Specifically, we consider the problem of computing the worst case
attack when the attacker has a finite time window k = {0, . . . , ta} to at-
tack the system such as in Proposition 24. However, in this case we assume
that the intruder does not mind being detected after the attack is over, i.e.,
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stealthiness constraints are checked up to t = ta only. The following corollary
describes how to construct the optimal d.
Corollary 29. Consider the optimization Problem in (5.2) with tψd = 0
(finite stealthiness interval). Then, its solution can be obtained by solving
max
d,n∈{ta,...,ta+tzd}
n∑
k=0
Φzd(n− k)d(k)
s.t.
∣∣∣ τ∑
k=0
Φψd(τ − k)d(k)
∣∣∣ ≤ θ, τ = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
|d(k)| ≤ α, k = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
d(k) = 0, k = ta + 1, . . . .
(5.6)
Proof. We will prove that the optimal row to be maximized is in the set
{z(ta), . . . , z(ta + tzd)}. Let dˆ be the worst attack that maximizes µ =:
‖z‖[0,ta+tzd]∞ found by solving for the maximum impact over all the rows of
(5.3) where the stealthiness constraints are enforced up to t = ta. Assume
that dˆ was found by maximizing any row before z(ta) calling it row i. Since
the stealthiness constraints are imposed only up to ta and Φ(K) is LTI, we can
delay dˆ by ta−i steps (shift dˆ to the right) so that ‖z‖[0,ta+tzd]∞ = µ is achieved
by maximizing the row z(ta) without violating the stealthiness constraints.
In addition, we cannot shift the attack beyond z(ta) since dˆ(k) = 0 for t > ta.
As a result, maximizing ‖z‖[0,ta+tzd]∞ is equivalent to maximizing ‖z‖[ta,ta+tzd]∞
for tψd = 0.
Remark 30. The optimization problem in (5.6) differs from the problem in
(5.4) in two ways: First, the stealthiness constraints set in (5.6) is a subset of
the set in (5.4), since in (5.6) the objective is to remain stealthy only during
the attack interval, where in (5.4) the stealthiness condition is enforced at all
times. Therefore, the attack designed using Corollary 29 yields worse impact
in the `∞ sense than the attack designed using Proposition 24. The second
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difference is in the objective function where in (5.4) we have to maximize
each row in (5.3) to find the worst attack (i.e., ta + tzd LPs), while in (5.6)
we only need to maximize the last rows associated with [z(ta), . . . , z(ta+ tzd)]
′
(i.e., tzd + 1 LPs). An immediate corollary is as follows.
Corollary 31. Let tzd = tψd = 0, i.e., the attacker cares to inflict maximum
damage in the window up to ta while he does not care for stealthiness after
ta. Then, the optimal d is obtained by solving the following single LP:
max
d
ta∑
k=0
Φzd(ta − k)d(k)
s.t.
∣∣∣ τ∑
k=0
Φψd(τ − k)d(k)
∣∣∣ ≤ θ, τ = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
|d(k)| ≤ α, k = 0, 1, . . . , ta.
(5.7)
The above corollary states that computing the worst attack when the at-
tack impact and stealthiness constraints are desired to be inside the attack
interval only is equivalent to solving (5.6) for n = ta.
Remark 32. If Φψd has an unstable zero that is not found in Φzd, and α is
not specified, then the optimization problems in Corollary 29 and Corollary
31 will yield unbounded zero dynamics attacks (Chapter 4).
5.4 Example - Worst Attack Computation
In this section we work on an example of a real power system component
and compute the worst attack for different scenarios.
5.4.1 Automatic Voltage Regulator
The automatic voltage regulator (AVR) or the generator excitation con-
trol, specifies the terminal voltage magnitude of a synchronous generator
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Figure 5.2: A simplified automatic voltage regulator block diagram.
by controlling the reactive power. A simplified block diagram of a linearized
AVR is shown in Figure 5.2 [58]. For a set of typical system parameters
KA = 10, τA = 0.1, KE = 1, τe = 0.4, KG = 1, τG = 1, KR = 1, τR = 0.05 as
in Figure 4.3. We consider actuator attacks as depicted in Figure 4.3 and
seek to find the attack with the worst impact on VF (excitation voltage) while
keeping the monitoring vector
ψ =
 y
u

below a noise level threshold θ. Let K be a suitable controller for the system
and let
P = S KA
1 + τAs
KE
1 + τEs
KG
1 + τGs
KR
1 + τRs
H and
PF = S KA
1 + τAs
KE
1 + τEs
H.
(5.8)
Then closed loop system Φ(K) describing the effect of d on z = VF and the
monitoring vector ψ is given by
Φ(K) =
Φzd
Φψd
 =: d 7→

z
y
u
 =

PF
1 + PK
P
1 + PK
PK
1 + PK

.
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Given
K =
0.1z − 0.09
z − 1 ,
then Φ(K) becomes
Φzd
Φψd
 =

0.8423z4−1.162z3−0.1551z2+0.5433z−0.06808
z5−3.186z4+3.794z3−2.043z2+0.4705z−0.03522
0.01114z4+0.05639z3−0.03266z2−0.03337z−0.001502
z5−3.186z4+3.794z3−2.043z2+0.4705z−0.03522
(1.11z4+5.75z3−2.59z2−2.99z−0.135)×10−3
z5−3.186z4+3.794z3−2.043z2+0.4705z−0.03522

sampled at T = 0.1 sec. We note that the has Φψd an unstable zero at
z = 1.42. We compute the attack for 3 cases:
• In the first case we employ Proposition 24 to compute the worst attack
for an attack interval {0, . . . , ta} that is stealthy for all t.
• In the second case, we compute the worst attack for an attack interval
{0, . . . , ta} using Proposition 29, i.e., stealthiness requirement for t ≤ ta
only.
• In the third case, we compute the worst attack using Corollary 31, i.e.,
max
d
z(ta) where the stealthiness requirement holds for t ≤ ta only.
For all cases, we fix ta = 500 (corresponding to 5 seconds), θ = 0.1, α = 100.
Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 show the computed worst attack signals for cases 1,
2 and 3 with their impact on the performance variable z and and monitoring
signal ψ. Case 1 was obtained by maximizing z(260) (corresponding to 2.6
seconds), Case 2 was obtained by maximizing z(520) (corresponding to 5.2
seconds) and case was obtained by maximizing z(500) (corresponding to 2.6
seconds). We note that the maximum impact on z in case 2 is larger than in
case 3 which in turn is larger than in case 1, confirming remark 30.
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Figure 5.3: Case 1 - Stealthy for all t. Worst attack computation with effect
on z, y and u.
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Figure 5.4: Case 2 - Stealthy for t ≤ ta and tzd 6= 0. Worst attack computa-
tion with effect on z, y and u.
We also show in Figure 5.6a a plot for the maximum impact on z for all
ta for case 1. This is obtained by iterating ta ≥ 0 and solving (5.4) until
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Figure 5.5: Case 3 - Stealthy for t ≤ ta and tzd = 0. Worst attack computa-
tion with effect on z, y and u.
‖z‖∞ stops increasing. We note from Figure 5.6a that ‖z‖∞ stops increasing
after ta = 200 (corresponding to 2 sec). As a result, for this example solving
(5.1) is equivalent to solving (5.4) for ta ≥ 200. Furthermore, we show in
Figure 5.6b how of the worst impact yielded by the optimization problem in
5.4 changes with changing the sampling and hold time (T ). It is not clear
from the figure if a direct relationship between ‖z‖∞ and T exists. This is
because although for a faster rate the cardinality of the attack sequence for
a fixed time interval increases allowing for extra optimization variables, the
number of stealthiness constraints also increases, reducing the set of feasible
solutions.
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Figure 5.6: (a): Worst impact for or different attack intervals ta.
(b): Worst impact for different sample and hold rate.
64
5.5 Controller Design for Resiliency - K-d iteration
In view of the previous discussion, a controller design procedure can be for-
mulated based on LP. In particular, given a desired `1 performance level γ
for attacks d, find K such that ‖Φzd(K)‖1 ≤ γ, and to ensure that for a
given attack level characterized by ‖d‖∞ ≤ α, where α is an attack resource
parameter, the “undetected loss” of the closed loop given by
µα := max
d
‖Φzd(K)d‖∞
s.t. ‖Φψd(K)d‖∞ ≤ θ,
‖d‖∞ ≤ α
remains below a desired level µ. Computing µα for a given K corresponds to
the problem of computing the worst d of the previous section. A synthesis
procedure can be developed by a “K-d” type of iteration:
• Given Ki with ‖Φzd(Ki)‖1 = γi find di from:
µi := max
d
‖Φzd(Ki)d‖∞
s.t. ‖Φψd(Ki)d‖∞ ≤ θ,
‖d‖∞ ≤ α.
• Given di find Ki+1 from:
γi+1 := min
K
‖Φzd(K)‖1
s.t. ‖Φzd(K)di‖∞ ≤ µi.
• At each iteration i the problem is an LP with
γi ≤ γi−1 ≤ γ0,
µi ≤ γi ‖di‖∞ ,
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‖di‖∞ ≤ α.
The above formulation guarantees that the upper bound on the attack impact
(i.e. µi) is non-increasing with each iteration.
5.6 Example - Controller Design for Resiliency
In this section we build on the AVR example in Section 5.4.1 sampled at
T = 0.1 sec and seek to design a controller that minimizes the performance
variable z while possibly minimizing the impact of the worst attack d. Sim-
ilar to Section 5.4.1 we start with a simple PI controller represented by the
transfer function
K1 =
0.1z − 0.09
z − 1 .
We use controller parametrization for stable transfer functions to set up the
controller optimization problem. As a result, the maps Φzd and Φψd are given
by
Φzd
Φψd
 =: d 7→

z
y
u
 =

PF
1 + PK
P
1 + PK
PK
1 + PK
.
 =
PF (1− PQ)P (1− PQ)
PQ
,
where
Q =
K
1 + PK
and P is the open loop transfer function of the AVR system given in (5.8)
along with PF , both sampled at T = 0.1 sec. The controller synthesis problem
is carried on the affine parameter Q in the time domain [68, 69] using the
following formulation:
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Table 5.1: Outcomes of γi and µi For Each Iteration
Iteration i γi = ‖Φzd(Ki)‖1 µi = ‖Φzd(Ki)di‖∞
1 64.6449 3.8008
2 37.0244 2.0107
3 36.9109 0.5704
4 36.9109 0.5704
• Given Ki with ‖Φzd(Ki)‖1 = γi find di from:
µi = max
d,n∈{0,1,...,ta+tzd}
n∑
k=0
Φzd(n− k)d(k)
s.t.
∣∣∣ τ∑
k=0
Φψd(τ − k)d(k)
∣∣∣ ≤ θ, τ = 0, 1, . . . , ta + tψd,
|d(k)| ≤ α, k = 0, 1, . . . , ta,
d(k) = 0, k = ta + 1, . . . .
• Given di find Ki+1 from:
γi+1 := min
q
‖pF ∗ (1− p ∗ q)‖1
s.t. ‖pF ∗ (1− p ∗ q) ∗ di‖∞ ≤ µi
‖q‖∞ ≤ β
q(t) = 0, t ≥ tq,
where p = {p(k)}, pF = {pF (k)} and q = {q(k)} are the pulse responses of
P , PF and Q respectively, and tq and β are design constraints for shaping
the controller. The problem is solved for the following parameters: ta = 500,
tq = 500, θ = 0.1, α = 100, and β = 100. The optimal Q is finite impulse
response (FIR). Table 5.1 shows the outcome of the controller synthesis it-
erative procedure. From the table we see that at each iteration we improved
the performance and reduced the impact of the worst d until no further im-
provement is feasible. Figures 5.7-5.10 show the results of the first and last
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iterations of the controller design process. Figures 5.7a, 5.8a, 5.9a, 5.10b
plot the computed worst attack d and its impact on the variables z, y and u.
Figures 5.7b, 5.8b, 5.10a plot the optimized controller parameter impulse re-
sponse q, and the effect of the previous d on the variables z, y and u governed
by the new controller (i.e. Φzd(Ki+1)di and Φψd(Ki+1)di). We note that for
iteration 1, although ‖Φzd(K1)d1‖∞ = ‖Φzd(K2)d1‖∞, d1 is no longer optimal
for the next iteration because ‖Φψd(K2)d1‖∞ ≥ θ as seen in Figure 5.7b.
5.7 Conclusions
We considered the problem of computing worst case bounded stealthy false
data injection attacks for LTI systems. We considered different attack re-
source constraints and stealthiness intervals. This problem involves a maxi-
mization of a convex function subject to convex constraints, and it was shown
that it can be cast as a series of LP problems under the `∞ framework. A
search algorithm is constructed to solve the set of LPs and was used to com-
pute the worst stealthy attacks on AVR systems. Furthermore, we provided
an iterative controller synthesis procedure that alternates between comput-
ing worst attacks and designing optimal controllers that enhance performance
and minimize the impact of worst attacks. We used this method to design a
controller for the AVR system that resulted in a substantial decrease in the
worst impact inflicted by the worst attack.
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(a) Computation of d1 given K1, and the effect of d1 on z, y and u.
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(b) Computation of q2, and the effect of d1 on z, y and u controlled by K2.
Figure 5.7: Controller synthesis using K-d iteration. Iteration 1.
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(b) Computation of q3, and the effect of d2 on z, y and u controlled by K2.
Figure 5.8: Controller synthesis using K-d iteration. Iteration 1.
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(a) Computation of d3 given K3, and the effect of d2 on z, y and u.
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(b) Computation of q4, and the effect of d3 on z, y and u controlled by K2.
Figure 5.9: Controller synthesis using K-d iteration. Iteration 1.
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(a) Computation of q4, and the effect of d3 on z, y and u controlled by K4.
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(b) Computation of d4 given K4, and the effect of d4 on z, y and u.
Figure 5.10: Controller synthesis using K-d iteration. Iteration 4.
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CHAPTER 6
ON THE ESTIMATION OF SIGNAL
ATTACKS
6.1 Introduction
We consider the problem of estimating signal attacks on actuators and/or
sensors of control systems using the available measurements. The estimated
attack signal will help the operator decide whether it is a persistent intelli-
gent attack or just a nominal disturbance. First, we show that the design
of controller for estimation and controller for rejection are coupled, and that
a trade-off exists between their individual performances. The quality of the
estimate depends on the performance of the attack rejection controller. In
particular, the faster and better we reject the attack, the worse is the attack
estimate. This is of course assuming the attack can be detected or seen from
the outputs used for estimation.
Next we consider multirate (MR) sampling to estimate the injected attack
d. In particular, we consider the case where we have two sets of sensors mea-
suring the output. The first set is sampled at the same rate of the hold device,
and is used to provide input for the feedback controller creating a single rate
control system. The second set is secure and is sampled at a higher frequency,
and is used for attack detection and estimation. This architecture is practical
for different applications such as wireless networked control systems, where
the sensor measurements are sent over wireless (unsecured) networks to the
control center, and the control signals are sent back to the physical plant
again over wireless networks. A local estimator that has access to some of
the measurements over hard-wired secure lines can be built to generate the
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attack estimates in this kind of scenario. The faster sampling loop is needed
so that all unbounded attacks are detectable (i.e. removes the unstable zeros)
[70] (Chapter 4), and to allow for the design of a certain class of observers
as will be discussed later. Furthermore, we want to estimate the attack at a
faster rate than control so that we can isolate the attack and limit the dam-
age as fast as possible. In addition to detecting unbounded attacks, removing
the unstable zeros is essential because they limit the achievable estimation
performance. The attack estimation problem is similar to the unknown input
observer (UIO) problem discussed in [71, 39, 72, 73, 74, 75, 41, 40] in which
such an observer exists if and only if the system is strongly detectable, i.e.,
all zeros are strictly stable. Multirate sampling guarantees that the system
has at most one non-minimum phase zero and is located at λ = 1, and un-
der specific conditions, multrirate sampling can remove all zeros in the lifted
domain. Conditions when a zero at λ = 1 exists in the MR scheme can be
found in [70]. After introducing dual rate sampling for attack estimation, we
introduce a few estimator design methods utilizing the dual rate property.
In particular, we show that UIOs always exist if the dual rate system does
not have a zero at λ = 1. In addition, the observer provides an estimate of
the attack with a delay of a single time-step only. This result is significant
because single rate observers do not exist most of the time due to the hard
conditions for their existence [72], or they may exist but estimation is delayed
(the system must be strongly detectable) [71].
6.2 Problem Formulation
In the absence of zero dynamics attack possibilities, we investigate the trade-
off between the ability to control the damage that an attack d inflicts versus
the ability to estimate d. In other words, we would like to investigate whether
one can trade control performance for extra ability to estimate the attack
signal d. A relevant problem to study how to design a controller K jointly
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K
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u
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Figure 6.1: General block diagram to reject and estimate d.
with a filter F to reject as well as estimate d can be cast as
min
K,F
‖d 7→ z‖ , z =
z1
z2
 ,
where z1 relates to performance in terms of disturbance rejection, e.g., z1 =W1y
u
 and z2 relates to attack estimation, i.e., z2 = W2(d − dˆ), where dˆ
is the estimated attack and W1,2 are weights, as seen in the general block
diagram in Figure 6.1, where G is a general discrete LTI system. This type
of problem is convex in any norm when the Youla parametrization of all
stabilizing controllers [68, 69] is employed. The estimated signal will help
the system operator decide whether the rejected signal is a carefully designed
attack or just a random disturbance.
The input-output map of the system in Figure 6.1 can be described as:
z1
z2
y
 =

G11 G12 G13
G21 G22 G23
G31 G32 G33


d
u
dˆ
 ,
where G32 is the open loop discrete time LTI plant. For z2 defined as z2 =
W (d− dˆ) and z1 does not depend on dˆ, we have G13 = G22 = G33 = 0, G21 =
75
W, G23 = −W . For actuator-only attacks, we have
G31 = G32,
while for sensor-only attacks
G31 = I.
The remaining maps G11 and G12 depend on how z1 is defined. The input-
output map is now more sparse and can be described by:
z1
z2
y
 =

G11 G12 0
W 0 −W
G31 G32 0


d
u
dˆ
 .
The closed loop map Tzd can then be found and isTz1d
Tz2d
 =
G11
W
+
G12 0
0 −W
K
F
(I − [G32 0]
K
F
)−1G31
=
G11 +G12K(I −G32K)−1G31
W −WF (I −G32K)−1G31
 .
It is easy to see that minimizing ‖Tz1d‖ depends only on finding the op-
timal K and can be solved as a model matching problem. On the other
hand, minimizing ‖Tz2d‖ depends on finding the optimal K and F simul-
taneously. By inspecting Tzd, keeping ‖Tz2d‖ small is achieved by making
|F (I − G32K)−1G31| ≈ I for all frequencies. On the other hand, it is well
known that |K| has to be large for good disturbance rejection [38]. As a
result, a trade-off between good estimation and good disturbance rejection
exists. The following example demonstrates this trade-off.
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Figure 6.2: Tradeoff in performance between rejection and estimation.
6.3 Example
Control design for rejection and estimation of the attack was carried out for
the AVR system in Figure 4.3. The attack is assumed to be a step input.
The controller is synthesized using the method of H∞ control [43, 42], using
the tools in MATLAB. The chosen weights are
W1 =
0.009995
λ− 1.001 , W2 = α
0.009995
λ− 1.001 ,
where α represents the emphasis on the estimation performance. We can
deduce from Figures 6.2 and 6.3 that for this example, as α increases, the
rejection performance deteriorates while the estimation performance is en-
hanced (dˆ converges faster to the true attack value). Hence, a trade-off exists
between control and estimation.
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Figure 6.3: Attack estimation for different values of α.
6.4 Estimation Via Multirate Sampling
6.4.1 Motivation and Control Loop Architecture
Next we consider multirate (MR) sampling to estimate the injected attack d.
In particular, we consider the case where we have two sets of sensors measur-
ing the output. The first set is sampled at the same rate of the hold device,
and is used to provide input for the feedback controller creating a single rate
control system. The second set is secure and is sampled at a higher frequency,
and is used for attack detection and estimation as seen in Figure 6.4, where
G is the continuous-time LTI general input-output map. This architecture
is practical for different applications such as wireless networked control sys-
tems, where the sensor measurements are sent over wireless (unsecured and
delayed) networks to the control center, and the control signals are sent back
to the physical plant again over wireless networks. A local estimator that has
access to some of the measurements over hard-wired secure lines can be built
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Figure 6.4: General block diagram to reject and estimate d with secured
sensors.
to generate the attack estimates in this kind of scenario. Higher sampling
rate for the detection loop is recommended to detect stealthy unbounded at-
tacks, and to make it harder for attackers to design stealthy bounded attacks.
In addition, MR sampling removes unstable zeros (except for possibly one
zero at λ = 1) in the map from the attack signal d to the monitored signals
(y and possibly u).
Remark 33. The control loop in the architecture in Figure 6.4 can also be
dual rate. What is important is to have the output feeding the estimation loop
sampled at a sufficiently higher rate than that at which the attack is injected
into the system. This helps in detecting the attack faster, and ensures that
the system detects unbounded stealthy actuator or sensor attacks.
6.4.2 Estimator Design
In this section we present a few control methods for the design of the esti-
mator F for a fixed controller K, for the architecture in Figure 6.4. First we
find the mapping from d to the measurements
 y˜
yT
 = Gd
d
u
 =
LST/mG11H LST/mG12H
LSTG21H LSTG22H

d
u
 ,
where y˜(k) = [y′c1(kT/m) y
′
c1((k+ 1)T/m) . . . y
′
c1((k+m− 1)T/m)]′, yT (k) =
yc2(kT ), G11 is the mapping from d to yc1, G12 is the mapping from u to
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yc1 and G21 is the mapping from d to yc2, G22 is the mapping from u to
yc2, yc1 and yc2 are the continuous-time measurements feeding ST/m and
ST respectively, and L is the lifting operator. G11 may represent actuator
attacks or sensor attacks as explained in section 6.2. In view of the above,
let G be controllable, observable and have the following representation:
G =

A B1 B2
C1 D11 D12
C2 D21 0
 , (6.1)
then
Gd =

Ad B1d B2d
C˜1 D˜11 D˜12
C2 D21 0
 ,
where
C˜1 =

C1
C1Af
...
C1A
m−1
f

, D˜11 =

D11
D11 + C1B1f
...
D11 + C1
∑m−2
k=0 A
k
fB1f

,
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D˜12 =

D12
D12 + C1B2f
...
D12 + C1
∑m−2
k=0 A
k
fB2f

,
and
Ad := e
AT , Af := e
AT/m,
B1d :=
∫ T
0
eAτB1dτ, B2d :=
∫ T
0
eAτB2dτ,
B1f :=
∫ T/m
0
eAτB1dτ, B2f :=
∫ T/m
0
eAτB2dτ
Now for a given controller K with state space
K =
 AK BK
CK DK
 ,
the input-output map from d to yT/m is described as
P˜ =

Ad +B2dDKC2 B2dCK B1d +B2dDKD21
BKC2 AK BKD21
C˜1 + D˜12DKC2 D˜12CK D˜11 + D˜12DKD21

, (6.2)
as seen in Figure 6.5, where n is sensor noise.
In Chapter 4 we showed that if P˜ has a non-minimum phase zero, then
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Figure 6.5: Block diagram for estimator design in the lifted domain. P˜ is
dual rate, lifted and augmented with a controller for stabilization.
this zero is located at λ = 1, and its multiplicity is 1. As a result, dual
rate control renders the system secure against unbounded stealthy actuator
attacks. This applies to any G11 of any structure (as long as K does not
introduce a zero at λ = 1). For the case when G11 is tall and has no zeros
at the origin, [76] (Theorem 1) states that P˜ has no zeros at all for almost
all m ∈ R such that m > 1. In our MR scheme in Chapter 4 and in this
chapter, we only consider m to be an integer.
6.4.2.1 Model Matching
The problem of finding the best dˆ (in some sense) can now be cast as
min
F
∥∥∥W −WF˜P˜∥∥∥ ,
or in the case of noisy measurements
min
F
∥∥∥W (I 0)−WF˜ (P˜ I)∥∥∥
such that F is stable (to minimize noise amplification) and causal. Since we
are solving the problem in the lifted domain, the causality of F is guaranteed
by enforcing the constraint that F (0) is block lower triangular. Several meth-
ods to solve this synthesis problem can found in [49, 50, 51, 52, 60, 77, 61, 78].
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6.4.2.2 Unknown Input Reconstruction
In this section we seek to exploit dual rate sampling to accurately reconstruct
the unknown input (attack) d injected in the system in Figures 6.4 and 6.5, as
well as the initial condition x(0). In particular, we consider the relationship
between the states and input from one end and the output of the system
from another end. This relationship has been studied for single rate systems
in the context of strong observability in the literature [39, 40, 41].
We consider the state space description P˜ in (6.2). We assume for now
(without loss of generality) that K = 0; we also assume that the measure-
ments are noise free, as a result P˜ reduces to
P˜ =
 Ad B1d
C˜1 D˜11
 . (6.3)
The lifted output of P˜ can be described as

y(0)
y(T/m)
y(2T/m)
...
y((m− 1)T/m)

=

C1
C1Af
C1A
2
f
...
C1A
m−1
f

x(0)+

D11
D11 + C1B1f
D11 + C1B1f + C1AfB1f
...
D11 + C1
∑m−2
k=0 A
k
fB1f

d(0).
(6.4)
From the above equation, we can deduce that x(0) and d(0) can be recov-
ered without delay with respect to the original single rate system if and only if
[
C˜1 D˜11
]
(6.5)
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is full column rank. A necessary condition for (6.5) to have full column rank
is that P˜ be strongly observable, i.e., have no invariant zeros [39, 40].
Strong observability of P˜ is guaranteed if G11 is tall and does not have a
zero at the origin for a sufficiently large m (Theorem 1 in [76]), given that
(Af , C1) is observable. Choosing m to satisfy Assumptions 17 and 18 of
section 2.1 is one choice. Strong observability does not imply that (6.5) is
full column rank; however, (6.5) can be made to have full column rank by
choosing m sufficiently large [48]. The idea is to add more linearly indepen-
dent rows to (6.5) by sampling faster until (6.5) is tall. The added rows are
linearly independent because m satisfies Assumptions 17 and 18, assuming
|C1B1d| 6= 0 as mentioned in section 2.1.
Remark 34. The advantages of MR sampling here are (1) It makes P˜
strongly observable, and (2) It makes (6.5) full column rank. Hence, MR
sampling guarantees that such an observer always exists (assuming G11 is
tall and does not have a zero at the origin), which may not be the case for
single rate systems.
Remark 35. The attack and the states are reconstructed with no delay with
respect to original single rate period T . Still, m samples are needed within T ,
so in actual continuous-time the delay is T sec (or one sample period of the
original single rate). In contrast, for single rate systems the delay can be up
to nT where n is the dimension Ad (assuming the observer exists for single
rate, i.e., assuming the single rate system is strongly observable).
Remark 36. As long as we choose m to make P˜ strongly observable, then we
can still reconstruct d using delayed measurements (i.e., y˜(0), y˜(1), . . . , y˜(n),
where n is the dimension of Ad) even if (6.5) is not full column rank. The
amount of delay would be smaller than for single rate systems (provided that
the single rate system is strongly observable). Details about this scheme for
single rate systems can be found in [39].
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Figure 6.6: A simplified automatic voltage regulator block diagram.
6.4.2.2.1 Example - Automatic Voltage Regulator
We revisit the AVR example of section 4.3.2. A simplified block diagram of
a linearized AVR is shown in Figure 6.6 [58]. The open loop state space
representation of the single rate system after discretization at a sample rate
T = 0.5 sec is
Ad =

0.0105 0.3949 3.86 2.869
−0.0057 −0.1817 −1.369 −0.587
0.00117 0.03359 0.1793 −0.4597
0.00092 0.03197 0.3163 0.8918

,
Bd =

−0.005738
0.001174
0.0009193
0.0002165

, Cd =
[
0 0 0 5000
]
, Dd =
[
0
]
,
which has an unstable zero at λ = −0.7045. Since the system has an un-
stable zero, we know that we cannot reconstruct attacks even if we use an
arbitrary large number of measurements. Next we know from section 4.3.2
that dual rate sampling at a rate of T/m = 0.25 sec removes the unstable
zero when viewed from the lifted domain. The resulting open loop state
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space representation after lifting is
A˜ = Ad, B˜ = Bd, C˜ =
 0 0 0 5000
2.185 86.13 1092 4902
 , D˜ =
 0
0.196
 .
Although the open loop system is strongly observable using m = 2 for dual
rate sampling, [C˜ D˜] is not full column rank, and we cannot reconstruct
actuator without delay. Next if we select m = 5, the resulting C˜ and D˜
matrices become
C˜ =

0 0 0 5000
0.38 21.38 491.24 4994.4
1.53 64.35 917.65 4948.5
2.80 106.05 1238.6 4839.5
3.86 138.22 1454.3e 4671.5

, D˜ =

0
0.011
0.10
0.32
0.66

.
Now [C˜ D˜] is full column rank and the attack along with x(0) can be
reconstructed without delay.
This concludes how to reconstruct d using dual rate sampling. The case
where K is augmented in P˜ as in (6.2) can be handled similarly as long as
K does not introduce a zero at λ = 1 in the closed loop map from d to yT/m.
6.4.2.3 Unknown Input Observer
In the previous section we saw how to reconstruct d and x(0) given that P˜ is
sampled faster than the rate at which the input is feeding the system. How-
ever, the method involved inverting a matrix with high dimensions, which
might be computationally expensive. A cheaper alternative is to design a
dual rate unknown input observer that estimates the states of the system
asymptotically, and then estimates the attack d using the state estimates.
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The theory for single rate unknown input observers is well studied and can
be found in [39, 71, 73, 72, 74, 75] and the references therein. In this sec-
tion, we will extend the theory to design a dual rate observer to estimate
the attack in Figure 6.4. Dual rate unknown input observers were briefly
mentioned in [76], however, the authors assumed D11 and D12 to be equal to
zero in (6.1), which changes the analysis and the conditions for existence of
the observer and how the attack is estimated. In addition, they invert the
matrices |C1B1f | which we are trying to avoid.
We consider the state space description P˜ in (6.2), assuming without loss
of generality that K = 0 and that the measurements are noise free. P˜ is then
represented by
x(k + 1) = Adx(k) +B1dd(k)
y˜(k) = C˜1x(k) + D˜11d(k).
(6.6)
We assume that B1d
D˜11

is full column rank. We consider an observer of the form
xˆ(k + 1) = Exˆ(k) + Ly˜(k), (6.7)
where E and L are matrices to be designed.
Definition 37. The system (6.7) is said to be an unknown input dual rate
observer with rate T/m if xˆ(k)−x(k)→ 0 as k →∞, regardless of the input.
We note that the observer in (6.7) does not depend on the input to the
system (6.6). To choose the observer matrices E and L, we examine the
estimation error
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e(k + 1) = xˆ(k + 1)− x(k + 1)
= Exˆ(k) + Ly˜(k)− Adx(k)−B1dd(k)
= Ee(k) + Ly˜(k) + (E − Ad)x(k)−B1dd(k)
= Ee(k) + (E − Ad + LC˜1)x(k) + (LD˜11 −B1d)d(k).
In order to force the error to go to zero, regardless of the values of x(k) and
d(k), E and L must simultaneously satisfy
LD˜11 = B1d (6.8)
E = Ad − LC˜1 (6.9)
such that E is stable. There exists a matrix L that satisfies (6.8) if and only
if B1d is in the space spanned by the rows of D˜11, which is equivalent to
rank
(B1d
D˜11
) = rank(D˜11). (6.10)
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of E and L that satisfy
(6.8) and (6.9) are that P˜ is strongly detectable (i.e., all zeros of P˜ are strictly
stable), and that (6.10) holds.
The strong detectability condition is inherited from the conditions of exis-
tence of UIO for single rate systems. We know that using dual rate sampling
guarantees that at most one zero exists and is at λ = 1; therefore, checking
P˜ for this zero is sufficient to check for the strong detectability of P˜ , as long
as Assumptions 17 and 18 are met. Furthermore, strong observability of P˜ ,
which is a more strict property, is guaranteed if G11 is tall and does not have
a zero at the origin, as long as Assumptions 17 and 18 are met. Now to
ensure the solvability of (6.8), m is chosen long enough until (6.10) holds.
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Once a state observer is constructed, we can obtain an estimate of the
attack by first rearranging (6.6) as
x(k + 1)− Adx(k)
y˜(k)− C˜1x(k)
 =
B1d
D˜11
 d(k). (6.11)
Since
B1d
D˜11
 is full column rank, there exists a matrix R such that
R
B1d
D˜11
 = I,
where I has the appropriate dimension. Left multiplying (6.11) by R and
using xˆ(k) instead of x(k), we find the estimate of the attack to be
dˆ(k) = R
xˆ(k + 1)− Adxˆ(k)
y˜(k)− C˜1xˆ(k)
 .
Since
xˆ(k)− x(k)→ 0 as k →∞,
dˆ(k) will asymptotically approach d(k).
Note that there is a single step delay in computing the attack estimate. In
case of single rate sampling, there will be at most n + 1 steps delay where
n is the dimension of the vector x in (6.6), if the observer exists (i.e. if the
single rate system is strongly detectable) [39]. Single rate observers have to
accumulate several measurements to be able to estimate the attack, which
during several instants of the attack signal are injected into the system.
Therefore, dual rate sampling provides a much more secure framework of
control, and guarantees that UIOs always exist if G11 is tall and has no zeros
at the origin.
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6.4.2.3.1 Examples
We provide two examples to illustrate the design of unknown input observers
for dual rate systems.
Example 1- Simple first-order system
We consider the following stable, non-minimum phase first-order system
G =
s− 1
s+ 2
.
We use dual rate control to remove the unstable zero at the sampling rates
T = 1 sec and T = 0.5 sec. The state space representation of the lifted
system is
Ad = 0.1353, Bd = 0.4323, C˜ =
 −3
−1.104
 , D˜ =
 1
−0.9482
 ,
which removes the unstable zero and makes rank
(B1d
D˜11
) = rank(D˜11).
Since B ∈ R1×1 and D ∈ R2×1, L ∈ R1×2. Let L be defined as L =
[
L1 L2
]
.
Solving for LD˜ = B we get
[
L1 L2
] 1
−0.9482
 = 0.4323,
which gives L1 = 0.4323 + 0.9482L2. Plugging this back and solving for
Ad − LC˜ to be stable, we get
Ad − LC˜ = 0.1353−
[
0.4323 + 0.9482L2 L2
] −3
−1.104

= −1.2969− 2.8446L2 − 1.104L2 = −1.2969− 3.95L2
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|Ad − LC˜| < 1 =⇒ −0.58 < L2 < −0.075.
Example 2 - Automatic Voltage Regulator
We revisit the AVR example of section 4.3.2. A simplified block diagram of
a linearized AVR is shown in Figure 6.7 [58]. The open loop state space
representation of the single rate system after discretization at a sample rate
T = 0.5 sec is
Ad =

0.0105 0.3949 3.86 2.869
−0.0057 −0.1817 −1.369 −0.587
0.00117 0.03359 0.1793 −0.4597
0.00092 0.03197 0.3163 0.8918

,
Bd =

−0.005738
0.001174
0.0009193
0.0002165

, Cd =
[
0 0 0 5000
]
, Dd =
[
0
]
,
which has an unstable zero at λ = −0.7045. We note that although the
continuous system has no unstable zeros, sampling at the relatively slow
rate of 0.5 sec per sample created an unstable zero. Since the system has
an unstable zero, we know that we cannot construct a single rate unknown
input observer of the form
xˆ(k + 1) = Exˆ(k) + Ly(k : k + n)
to estimate actuator attacks even if we use an arbitrary large number of
measurements. Next we know from section 4.3.2 that dual rate sampling at
a rate of T/m = 0.25 sec removes the unstable zero when viewed from the
lifted domain. The resulting open loop state space representation after lifting
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Figure 6.7: A simplified automatic voltage regulator block diagram.
is
A˜ = Ad, B˜ = Bd, C˜ =
 0 0 0 5000
2.185 86.13 1092 4902
 , D˜ =
 0
0.196
 .
(6.12)
And the condition rank
(Bd
D˜
) = rank(D˜) is satisfied. We construct a
dual rate unknown input observer of the form (6.7), i.e.,
xˆ(k + 1) = Exˆ(k) + Ly˜(k),
where E and L satisfy (6.8), (6.9) and (6.12). Since (6.12) has no unstable
zeros and (6.10) is satisfied, then we know such an E and L exist. Using
MATLAB solver, we find E and L to be
E =

0.074 2.91 35.70 −3413.41
−0.013 −0.47 −5.00 9003.32
0.013 0.51 6.21 −734.21
0.0063 0.25 3.02 −5.42

, L =

0.7118 −0.0292
−1.8040 0.0033
0.1522 −0.0055
0.0037 −0.0025

.
We note that for the above AVR example, sampling faster using m = 2
was sufficient to estimate the states and the attack asymptotically, while in
section 6.4.2.2.1, we saw that m = 5 was needed to accurately reconstruct
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the states and the attack for each period T . This observation makes sense
as it means more measurements are needed for accurate estimation for each
period T vs. asymptotic estimation.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we posed the problem of estimating signal attacks injected
into the actuators or sensors of control systems. We showed that there exists
a trade-off between attack rejection and estimation, and that the estima-
tor design depends on the controller used. We used dual rate sampling to
enhance the detectability of the attack and we provided three methods to
design the estimator. Method 1 solves a model matching problem subject
to causality constraints. Method 2 exploits dual rate sampling to accurately
reconstruct the unknown input. Method 3 uses a dual rate unknown input
observer. Using dual rate sampling, necessary and sufficient rank and zero
location conditions to check the existence of the observers in methods 2 and
3 are provided. Once these conditions are satisfied, then the attack can be
estimated with at most a single step delay. This work shows again the impor-
tance of studying the security problem in the SD framework, and the power
of using dual rate sampling to design observers for the detection and estima-
tion of signal attacks. Dual rate sampling ensures that UIOs always exist if
the continuous-time map from the attack to the output is tall and has no zero
at the origin, which may not be the case for single rate observers. A future
research direction is to study dual rate unknown input observers discussed
in the last section when noise is present in the measurements. Optimal es-
timators for the single rate delayed UIOs were discussed in [73] (minimizing
mean square error), but to our knowledge no results exist for the dual rate
UIOs.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this thesis, we introduced a sampled-data framework to study the effect
of attacks on cyber-physical systems. We defined the attack detection mech-
anism and derived the input-output maps for actuator and sensor attacks
on the monitoring signals. We showed that unbounded stealthy actuator
attacks are related to the open-loop discrete plant unstable zeros, while un-
bounded stealthy sensor attacks are related to the open-loop discrete plant
unstable poles. We also showed that coordinated actuator and sensor at-
tacks can always be designed to be stealthy and unbounded regardless of
the locations of poles and zeros of the plant. Next we presented a dual rate
sampled data scheme which guarantees detectability of unbounded actuator
and/or sensor attacks, if a secure output that maintains observability of the
open loop modes is available. The main observation is that the sampled
data nature in the implementation of the cyber-physical system cannot be
ignored as sampling can generate additional vulnerabilities due to the extra
unstable zeros it may introduce, particularly if high rates are necessary to
achieve certain performance level. The proposed method solves this issue by
the use of multirate sampling that ensures that zeros exist only in harmless
locations in the lifted domain. A few examples were presented that show how
the multirate scheme detects the unbounded actuator attacks. In addition,
the examples incorporated a dual rate controller cost comparison based on
LQG control. After that we studied the problem of computing worst case
bounded stealthy false data injection attacks for LTI systems. We considered
different attack resource constraints and stealthiness intervals. This problem
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involves a maximization of a convex function subject to convex constraints,
and it was shown that it can be cast as a series of LP problems under the
`∞ framework. A search algorithm is constructed to solve the set of LPs and
was used to compute the worst stealthy attacks on AVR systems. Further-
more, we provided an iterative controller synthesis procedure that alternates
between computing worst attacks and designing optimal controllers that en-
hance performance and minimize the impact of worst attacks. We used this
method to design a controller for the AVR system that resulted in a sub-
stantial decrease in the worst impact inflicted by the worst attack. Lastly,
we posed the problem of estimating signal attacks injected into the actua-
tors or sensors of control systems, assuming the attack is detectable (can be
seen at the output). We showed that their exists a trade-off between attack
rejection and control, and that the estimator design depends on the con-
troller used. We used dual rate sampling on the secured sensors to enhance
detectability of the attack, and we provided different methods to design the
estimator. The first method is by solving a model matching problem subject
to causality constraints. The second method exploited dual rate sampling
to accurately reconstruct the unknown input. The third method is using an
unknown input observer. Using dual rate sampling, necessary and sufficient
conditions to check the existence of the observers are provided. The work
shows the importance of studying the security problem in the SD framework,
and shows the power of using dual rate sampling to design observers to detect
and estimate attacks. Dual rate sampling ensures that UIOs always exist if
the continuous-time map from the attack to the output is tall and has no
zero at the origin, which may not be the case for single rate observers.
Several future research directions can be investigated. One direction is
to study methods to detect unbounded stealthy sensor attacks described in
Chapter 3 in the absence of secure sensors. We showed in Chapter 4 that
multirate sampling removes the unstable zeros in the lifted domain and can
detect unbounded actuator attacks. However, this method cannot detect
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sensor attacks related to the unstable poles if the attacker has knowledge
of the multirate scheme. One idea is to use stochastic sampling. It is well
known that the poles of the discrete plant are related to the sampling and
hold rate. Therefore, by changing the sample-hold rate in a random fashion
(e.g. Markov process with a known transition matrix), the attacker will not
be able to exactly determine the location of the unstable poles for each instant
of time, and hence will not be able to inject a stealthy attack. The problem
can be studied in the context of stochastic linear switched systems such as
the work in [79], or in the context of optimal control [80], and shows that
no stealthy attack is possible under certain stochastic/switching sampling
conditions.
Another future research direction is to quantify the minimum number of
sensors that need to be sampled faster to detect unbounded stealthy actu-
ator attacks. In Chapter 3 we showed that dual rate sampling can detect
unbounded stealthy actuator attacks under certain conditions. However, the
method and related proofs assumed that all outputs will be sampled faster.
The interesting question is whether we can remove the unstable zeros and
detect the attacks if only a subset of the outputs (in the case of MIMO sys-
tems) is sampled faster, and how we decide on which outputs to be selected
for faster sampling. Another way to state the problem would be to find the
minimum number of outputs that must be sampled faster to detect stealthy
actuator attacks.
Another future research direction is to study dual rate unknown input
observers discussed in Chapter 6 when noise is present in the measurements.
Optimal estimators for the single rate delayed UIOs were discussed in [73]
(minimizing mean square error), but to our knowledge no results exist for
the dual rate UIOs.
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